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Abstract 
     The aim of this study was to critically analyse the South Sudanese peace policy framework which has been 
expressed in its post-independence peace and development policies. The study also aimed at analyzing the nexus 
between peacebuilding and broader development agenda and at identifying types of discourses, beliefs and ideologies 
that have been adopted or relinquished in the South Sudanese peacebuilding framework. Any ideological impact of 
external factors in influencing peace policies was also critically analyzed. 
     Four policy documents namely the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, the South Sudan Development Plan 
2011-2013, the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013-2015 and the Comprehensive Strategic 
Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 2013 were selected and critically analysed using Norman 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for Critical Discourse Analysis: (1) linguistic features and texts, (2) 
interdiscursivity, and (3) explanation of wider social, political, historical and cultural contexts.  
     Key theoretical concepts surrounding peacebuilding have been discussed starting from the Kantian notion of 
perpetual peace and continuing to modern ideas of democratic peace theory, negative-positive peace, international 
engagement and liberal peacebuilding. More recent concepts of new wars and transitional justice systems have been 
discussed as well. 
     The study identifies altogether six discourses that are maintained through the policy documents. The identified 
discourses are the capitalist corporate discourse, the curative peace discourse, the development aid/dependency 
discourse, the good-governance discourse, the religious discourse and the reconciliation discourse.      
     The findings of this study suggest that the South Sudanese peacebuilding framework is based on building peace 
primarily through security measures and institutional strengthening while paying less attention to bottom-up 
approaches and people’s subjective wellbeing. In addition, the policy documents studied do not envision any form of 
transitional justice mechanism and lack a comprehensive national reconciliation program. This is likely to deepen 
pervasive impunity and result in further divisions, more belligerencies and bloodshed in the country.  
    The study also finds that the South Sudanese peace policy framework is heavily influenced by the so called Western 
idea of liberal peacebuilding that aim to promote liberal economy, Western-style democracy, marketization and 
globalization. Though the policy documents emphasize on democracy, good governance and human rights, their 
implementation modality is not clear. In addition, the policy documents lack coherency, one document prioritising 
one theme while another adopting a completely different approach, and the nexus between peacebuilding and 
broader development is poorly established.  
 
Keywords: South Sudan, Peacebuilding, Transitional Justice, Peace Policy, Peace Theories, Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
  
Preface 
 
When protracted conflicts and decades long suffering come to a formal conclusion, 
political emphasis and popular enthusiasm for ‘development’ and ‘progress’ are not 
uncommon. Countries in post-conflict scenario are often keen in introducing series 
of state-building measures and development initiatives that are aimed at 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The idea of building sustainable 
peace merely through institutional reforms and development initiatives is contestable.  
     As a student of Development Studies, I have had keen interest in peacebuilding 
and post-conflict issues, primary focus being as to why certain political and 
ideological choices are adopted in post-conflict situations; how do certain internal 
and external factors influence such choices and what are the consequences of making 
certain choices or adapting to or perpetuating certain ideologies, beliefs or set of 
discourses. On the other hand, having lived through Nepal’s ten year long bloody 
civil war and having witnessed civilians suffer horrendously, I am equally interested 
in transitional justice mechanisms and issues of healing, truth, reparation and 
national reconciliation in post-conflict scenarios like Nepal or South Sudan.     
     Apart from the intention to look at peacebuilding issues outside my native land, 
my attachment to South Sudan has a personal reason too; the memory of a deceased 
friend, a former South Sudanese rebel, who spent four years with me in college as a 
close friend, lived with the only dream to see a free Southern Sudan, but passed away 
untimely before that dream became a reality just a few months later.  
     Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to all those who supported me 
throughout this rather long and tedious process of thesis writing. First and foremost, 
special thanks to my supervisors Marjaana Jauhola, Susanne Dahlgren and Lauri 
Siitonen for their kind and consistent supervision. Many thanks to Professors Teivo 
Teivainen and Barry Gills for their tips and comments during thesis seminars and 
special thanks to Professor Jukka Törrönen for his insightful advice on using CDA 
and other tools of textual analysis.  
     Thank you, dear family and friends, for encouraging me in my every step and for 
understanding my long silences and usual disappearances.   
Helsinki, Finland  
August 2014 
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Chapter I  
 
Introduction  
 
“Let justice be done though the heavens fall.”  
- William Prynne, 1646  
 
“We have ended one struggle and now we must start a new one, that of nation 
building...Our purpose is to give to our children what the war took away from us: 
peace, rule of law, food security, health care, good education, running water, clean 
water, electric power, and opportunity for the pursuit of happiness and prosperity.”  
- Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, 2011  
 
After nearly five decades of bloodshed, in 2005, a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) signed between the separatist SPLM/A (Sudan’s People 
Liberation Movement/Army) rebels and the Sudanese government officially 
ended one of Africa's bloodiest civil wars, which claimed more than two 
million lives. The CPA divided the country into two different authorities, 
creating a federal governmental setup in the Sudan. Ultimately, in July 2011, 
as stipulated by the CPA, a referendum took place and a huge majority (98%) 
of Southern Sudanese opted for secession from the North. Thus, on 9 July 
2011, the Republic of South Sudan was born as the youngest nation on the 
planet.    
     Post-independence journey hasn’t been very smooth for South Sudan. As a 
newly formed nation, the country struggles to build its base almost from 
scratch and grapples with post-war nuisances, dilapidated socio-political 
structures and institutions ravaged by war.  The country faces huge external 
and internal challenges, and alternative is a failed state (Shinn 2011, p. 2). 
Thousands of people have died in conflicts that have erupted since 
independence. An internal dispute in the ruling party and a coup attempt 
claimed more than a thousand lives in early 2014 alone (UNMISS 2014).   
     In a war-shattered scenario like South Sudan, aspirations for peace, 
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however, are certainly high, at least amongst the common people. The country 
has introduced a number of policies that allegedly aim to build sustainable 
peace and integrate peacebuilding to broader development agendas. Having 
carried out Critical Discourse Analysis of selected four South Sudanese peace 
policy documents, this Master’s thesis seeks to critically analyze the peace 
policy framework of South Sudan. The primary aim is to look at different 
discourses, ideologies and beliefs that are sustained through or relinquished 
from policy documents especially at a time when the country is taking a 
transitional leap. 
     After a peace deal has been reached, the tendency to focus on state 
building measures, election processes and constitution making seems to be 
common. Policies for peacebuilding are likely to be introduced, but it is 
certainly useful to look at exactly where do such policies emanate from, from 
which ideological standpoint, what types of discourses they carry through and 
what do they seek to achieve.   
 
1.1 Research Question, Aim and Objectives  
The overall question this study tries to address is what type of peace policy 
framework South Sudan has adopted and what types of discourses, beliefs and 
ideologies have been adopted or relinquished in its post-independence peace 
and development policies.  
     While addressing the main research question, the study also looks at other 
issues such as whether peacebuilding has been linked to broader development 
agenda and, if so, how has that been manifested in the policy documents. The 
emphasis is also on whether particular notions, concepts, beliefs and 
discourses are adopted or rejected in the peace and development policy 
documents and weather such choices are affected by any internal or external 
ideological factors.  
     Sustainable peacebuilding, obviously, is a long-term process and requires 
‘a triumvirate of transformation: Transformation of the society from one that 
resorts to violence to one that resorts to political means to resolve conflict’ 
(Samuels 2005, p. 1). South Sudan’s post-independence journey towards 
sustainable peacebuilding hasn’t been too long, at least not long enough to 
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make conclusive remarks on its approach and achievements. However, given 
that the CPA was signed in 2005, which formally ended the ongoing war and 
envisioned sustainable peace in Southern Sudan 1 , and the country has 
introduced major peace and development policies and institutions such as 
National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, it is certainly not too early 
for preliminary remarks and reflections.  
     By addressing the issues mentioned above, the main objectives of the study 
are:  
- To illustrate how peace and development policies are influenced by 
certain ideas, discourses and set of beliefs.  
 
- To demonstrate how, if any, peace policies are integrated into greater 
development agenda/plans and manifested in policy documents.  
 
- To provide general understanding of South Sudanese peace process, its 
dynamics, key players and challenges that lie ahead.  
 
Thesis structure:  
This thesis is divided altogether into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the 
research question, aims and objectives; outlines research method and design; 
discusses sets of data and sampling method used and gives an overview of the 
significance and limitations of the study.     
     Chapter II presents a detailed overview of the research context, i.e. South 
Sudan, its decades long struggle for independence, the 2005 peace agreement 
and the momentous 2011 referendum. Chapter II discusses also the main 
causes and consequences of the North-South conflict, factors that led to 
peace agreement, post-secession tensions in South Sudan and an overview of 
development indicators and dire humanitarian needs. The chapter is closed by 
                                                
1 Southern Sudan refers to pre-indpendence terrioty, belonging to Sudan. After 
independence, it became the Republic of South Sudan.  
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reviewing a number of recent studies that focus on different aspects of 
peacebuilding in South Sudan.  
     Chapter III, on the other hand, discusses theories of peace and 
peacebuilding starting from the Kantian notion of perpetual peace and 
continuing to modern concepts of democratic peace theory; discussing in 
detail the idea and criticisms associated with liberal peacebuilding and 
international engagement.  In addition, Galtung’s ideas of negative-positive 
peace and issues of transitional justice and new forms of warfare will be 
discussed as well.  
     Chapter IV outlines the methodological standpoints adopted in this 
research, discussing different ways of carrying out Critical Discourse Analysis 
and understanding discourse in socio-political domain. The chapter 
elaborates also the concepts of genre and intertextuality and discusses 
Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional model of CDA in detail. 
     Chapter V carries out a Critical Discourse Analysis of the selected four 
Policy documents by using Norman Fairclouh’s three dimensional approach 
to CDA and discusses the major findings. The chapter begins with a textual 
analysis of the text and moves onward to explore the ‘interdiscursivity’, i.e. 
treating text as discursive practice, in the case of Policy documents. Altogether 
six discourses have been identified and thoroughly discussed before presenting 
a contextual positioning of the discourses identified.  
     Chapter VI presents major findings of the study with some conclusive 
remarks. A second section of the chapter offers a few recommendations for 
future research.      
 
1.2 Research Method and Design 
Policies for peacebuilding are fairly common in post-conflict situations. The 
question, however, is how holistic, integrated and comprehensive such policies 
tend to be. On the other hand, equally important question is of discourses. 
Why some notions, beliefs, and discourses are included, adopted and 
consolidated, while some are abandoned and rejected? How do new ideas get 
introduced through policy documents in the aftermath of a violent conflict or 
a peace deal? In line with these questions, a second question would be of 
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priority setting too. Why some activities are prioritized, for instance 
disarmament and institutional reforms, or state-building in general, and other 
activities, such as transitional justice or reconciliation processes, get 
insufficient attention and lack a national priority? If so, why is it so? In a 
nutshell, this thesis aims to address these issues in the South Sudanese post- 
conflict context, and that is done by using a constructivist epistemological 
approach.  
     Selection of the right and relevant research method is important for any 
research, but more specifically for the study of this type. As there seems to be 
no comprehensive studies done previously particularly on this subject, a 
thorough and vigorous explanation is needed to come to a better 
understanding. Methodologically this study employs qualitative sets of tools 
and is a qualitative study in nature. 
     Denzin & Lincoln argue that qualitative research 'involves an interpretive, 
specific naturalistic approach to the world,' meaning that qualitative 
researchers 'study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, 
or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them' 
(2000, p.3). Snape & Spencer define qualitative research as a 'blend of 
empirical investigation and creative discovery' and argue that 'qualitative 
methods are used to address research questions that require explanation or 
understanding of social phenomena and their contexts. They are particularly 
well suited to exploring issues that hold some complexity and to studying 
processes that occur over time' (2003, p.5). 
     Adopting a constructivist epistemological approach means seeking 
subjective explanations of phenomena to study or accepting that 'knowledge 
and reality do not have an objective or absolute value or, at the least, that we 
have no way of knowing this reality' (Murphy 1997, p.5).  
     Descriptive studies, though can be qualitative as well as quantitative, seek 
to find out 'what is' and 'can yield rich data that lead to important 
recommendations' (Knupfer & McLellan 2001). The focus, therefore, is not 
excessively on the methods to be employed, but on finding answers to the 
research question. Hereby, the aim of this study is to find out what type of 
policy framework is in place for sustainable peacebuilding in post-
independent South Sudan, and also to analyze what type of discourses are 
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sustained, strengthened and validated in policy documents formulated for 
peacebuilding. The focus is not only on what is included, but also on what is 
excluded.  
     A separate chapter elaborates on the specific methodological tools used in 
this study, whereas, the intention in this section is to provide an overall 
methodological standpoint and specific research design that has been used to 
tackle the research topic.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Research design illustration 
 
 
As presented in the chart above, the study makes use of a data set of four 
policy documents to tackle the research question. In order to analyze what 
one might call here the South Sudanese peace discourse; certain beliefs, 
notions, and ideas included and not included in peace policy documents, the 
study carries out a Critical Discourse Analysis of four significant peace policy 
documents.  
 
1.3 Research Data and Sampling   
Altogether, four policy documents were selected as data for the study. The 
following chart and subsequent description details how data was selected and 
explains the rationale behind their selection. 
 
Q: Peacebuilding 
framework/peaceb
uilding discourses 
of South Sudan  
Critical 
Discourse 
Analysis of 
Four Peace & 
Development 
Policies  
Discussion & 
Conclusions   
  
15 
  
Research Questions Research Data  Data Source  Reason for 
Selection 
Overall 
peacebuilding 
framework/ 
Discourses, beliefs 
and notions in 
peace policies 
 
Method: Critical 
Discourse Analysis 
of Policy 
Documents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy documents:  
-The 
Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement 
2005  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- UN Mission in 
South Sudan 
(UNMISS)  
 
 
 
 
 
-Provides road-
map for peace 
before and after 
referendum  
- A politically 
binding document 
signed between 
GoS and SPLM 
-South Sudan 
Development Plan 
2011-2013 
 
 
 
 
- Government of 
South Sudan 
(GoSS)  
 
 
 
- Most 
comprehensive 
development plan 
so far with a 
separate section for 
peacebuilding 
issues 
- South Sudan 
Peace and 
Reconciliation 
Strategy (2013-
2015) 
of South Sudan 
Peace and 
Reconciliation 
Commission 
 
- Crisis 
Management 
Initiative (CMI), 
Finland  
 
-Includes strategic 
measures for 
peacebuilding  
- Sets out priority 
areas for peace  
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As presented above, the following four policy documents was selected for the 
study:  
1. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 
2. South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013   
3. South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013-2015 
4. Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation 2013 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
2005: Signed in January 2005 in Kenya 
between the Sudan’s Peaople’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) and the Government 
of Sudan (GoS), The Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement was in fact a 
culmination of previous agreements 
signed during the peace process. A series 
of agreements were signed between the 
warring parties starting with The 
Machakos Protocol signed on 20 July 
2002 in Machakos, Kenya where the 
parties agreed on broad principles of 
 -Comprehensive 
Strategic 
Dimensions for 
Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation 
2013 
 
-The Committee 
for National 
Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation for 
South Sudan 
(the document was 
obtained from the  
Comboni 
Missionaries 
contact point in 
Juba, South Sudan) 
- provides South 
Sudanese official 
stance on issues of 
reconciliation and 
transitional justice  
 
The Protocol of Machakos: Signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 
20 July 2002, in which the parties agreed on a broad 
framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the 
transitional process and the structures of government as well 
as on the right to self-determination for the people of South 
Sudan, and on state and religion 
 
The Protocol on security arrangements: Signed in 
Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003 
 
The Protocol on wealth-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, 
Kenya, on 7 January 2004 
 
The Protocol on Power-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, 
Kenya, on 26 May 2004 
 
The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile 
States: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004 
 
The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyie: Signed 
in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004 
 
Source: UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 2013  
Figure 1.3: Six Protocols of the CPA  
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governance, government and management of the transitional process. Though 
the CPA has often been criticized for not being really comprehensive (see for 
instance,Ylönen 2012, p. 28-40) or for being exclusive club of the NPC and 
SPLM and not addressing many outstanding issues between the parties (Abdin 
2012, p. 5), the Agreement, however, ended Africa’s longest civil war and 
paved the way to a successful referendum that led to the birth of South Sudan. 
The Agreement also addressed issues of power sharing, wealth sharing and 
envisioned ‘self-determination to the people of South Sudan through a 
referendum and right of legislations based on Sharia for the North’ (Abdin 
2012, p. 1). The CPA was an outcome of prolonged negotiations facilitated by 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a consortium of 
donor countries, lead by the USA, UK and Norway, but also African leaders 
such as the Presidents of Kenya and Uganda. The international community 
praised the agreement and the CPA signing ceremony on 12 July 2005 was 
witnessed by the presidents of Uganda, Kenya, representatives from the United 
States of America, African Union, Egypt, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United 
Kingdom, European Union, IGAD, Arab League and the United Nations 
(Abdin 2012, p. 2).  
     Despite its limitations and criticisms surrounding, the CPA is undoubtedly 
the most comprehensive document to begin with when it comes to analyzing 
the peacebuilding framework of South Sudan. The Agreement, on the other 
hand, is a political promise done by the warring parties to a broader 
international community.  
     For the purpose of this study, an electronically archived scanned version of 
the original CPA was downloaded in December 2013 from the UN Mission’s 
South Sudan website. The entire document is 260 pages in length and includes 
6 chapters and 2 annexes. The document has been signed by representatives of 
both parties and a number of foreign delegates, including the presidents of 
Kenya and Uganda as well as the US Secretary of State.  
 
2. The South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013: The South Sudan 
Development Plan 2011-2013, hereafter referred simply as the Plan or the 
SSDP, was introduced by the Government of South Sudan in August 2011. 
The Plan, which is available online on the official website of the Government 
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of South Sudan (www.goss-online.org), is 437 pages in length and on the 
cover, under the main title, reads: “realising freedom, equality, justice, peace 
and prosperity for all.”  
     Introducing the Plan, the Minister for Finance and Economic Planning, 
David Deng Athorbei, states, 'The South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 
represents our aspirations as a new nation, following a long struggle for the 
freedom of the people of South Sudan. It provides a road-map for our future, 
setting out our priorities and the actions necessary to achieve rapid, inclusive 
and sustainable development' (SSDP 2011, p. xi).  
     The Plan is very comprehensive in the sense that it touches many aspects of 
South Sudan that range from projection of oil revenues to indicators of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, governance, economic 
development, social and human development, conflict prevention and security 
have been prioritized as main pillars or topmost themes of the plan. 
Peacebuilding issues have been largely included under the conflict prevention 
and security theme, but can be found scattered elsewhere as well. For the 
purpose of this study, peacebuilding policy issues were collected not only from 
the Conflict Prevention and Security section, but throughout the Plan.  
     It would be important to note that the Plan, like the CPA, was drafted and 
promulgated under the auspices of international donor community. The Plan 
mentions that the donor community provided financial as well logistical 
support including working as co-chairs in working groups (SSDP 2011, p. 
Xii).  
    Inclusion of the Plan as research data of this study was deemed useful for 
the fact that the Plan was introduced as one of the major policy responses 
from the Government of South Sudan in the aftermath of independence. On 
the other hand, the Plan’s comprehensive nature and its attempt to establish a 
link between peacebuilding with other areas of development  also makes it an 
ideal choice for this study.  
 
3.The South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategic Plan 2013-2015: In the 
aftermath of independence, when Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) 
was disbanded, as its task of promoting peace during the transitional period 
was completed, a new presidential degree (62/2011) gave birth to a new 
  
19 
commission that was named The South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission (SSPRC). According to the SSPRC, its duty is to ‘promote 
peaceful co-existence amongst the people of South Sudan and to advise the 
government on matters related to peace’ (SSPRC 2013). The commission’s 
mandate also include promoting ‘peace and reconciliation between conflicting 
communities, development of early warning system, campaigning for peaceful 
elections’ and establishment of a Peace Resource Centre in South Sudan’ (ibid). 
As of Jan 2014, the commission was chaired by Mr. Chuol Rambang Luoth 
and consisted of 8 administrative units (SSPRC 2013).  
     In January 2013, the SSPRC introduced its new three year strategic plan 
for the years 2013-2015. The Plan states that the Crisis Management Initiative 
(CMI) and its donor (i.e. the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland) provided 
funds and facilitated the development process of the plan (SSPRC 2013, p.5). 
In May 2013, this researcher obtained the 24 paged report from the CMI, as 
the SSPRC official website seems to be dysfunctional lately. 
     Selection of this plan for this study is important primarily for three reasons. 
First, the SSPRC has the official mandate of peacebuilding as stipulated by the 
government decree 62/2011. Second, the plan is relatively new, published in 
2013, and provides an updated information on recent developments in the 
country, and, third, the plan provides some sort of ‘official stance’ on internal 
as well as external challenges  to peacebuilding in South Sudan.  
 
4. Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 
2013: In August 2011, only one month after independence, South Sudan’s first 
vice-president Dr.Riek Machar Teny visited the Dinka Bor community and 
publicly apologized for his activities in 1991, after his split with SPLM, which 
resulted in violent killings of the Bor-Dinka and Lou-Nuer communities. By 
apologizing publicly, he became, reportedly, the first senior politician to start 
peace and national reconciliation in South Sudan (Dak 2012). He thus led a 
national reconciliation process, garnered significant media attention and 
planned a national reconciliation conference for April 2013 (Deng 2013). 
Allegedly, afraid of Vice-President’s popularity as a peace-builder and his 
plans to run for SPLM leadership in the future, President Salva Kiir suspended 
the national reconciliation process with a presidential order. The process was 
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revived on 23 April 2013 and the Archbishop of Episcopal Church, Daniel 
Deng Bul was appointed as its president (Sudan Tribune 2013).  Officially 
named as the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for 
South Sudan and authorized to work ‘independently’, the committee team 
includes three bishops, one representative from Muslim community and other 
representatives from South Sudanese civil society and federal states (AFJN, 
2013).  
     In July 2013, the Committee came up with a 20 paged document titled The 
Way Forward: Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation for all South Sudanese. The document starts and ends with 
verses from the Bible and emphasizes on faith based healing and reconciliation. 
The document was obtained from the Comboni Missionaries contact point in 
Juba, South Sudan. 
     As the report is the Committee’s official stance on healing, peace and 
reconciliation, it’s a very useful read to understand what type of peace South 
Sudan is trying to achieve and what type of reconciliation measures the 
country is initiating. On the other hand, it’s the latest publication from the 
Committee and very useful document for the scope of this research.  
 
1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Study  
As a qualitative study and as a study carried out without physically visiting 
the  country of research context, this study has a number of biases and 
limitations. Rajendran (2001) argues that qualitative researchers should 
‘acknowledge and take into account their own biases as a method of dealing 
with them’ (p.1).  
     First, when it came to selecting policy documents, only four documents, 
deemed most relevant, were selected, but a number of other policy documents, 
for instance the Act on DDR, that directly or indirectly deal with 
peacebuilding in South Sudan remained un-entertained. Selection was based 
on the central focus of the policies, their coverage, national policies instead of 
regional policies, their binding nature as well as likelihood of their immediate 
impact. Despite being comprehensive in nature, documents like South Sudan 
Vision 2040, were not selected for their overly idealistic nature, lack of clarity 
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about implementation and so forth.   
     Second, as South Sudan is in a fast moving transitional phase, different 
events and responses to them are rapidly changing. Discussions and 
conclusions presented in this thesis are based on past events and policy 
responses, and the study does not rely on or take into account of any possible 
future events or policy responses that might dramatically change the current 
scenario.  
     Third, this study has been affected by a sort of a empirical bias as well. 
The study relies on the selected policy documents and their qualitative 
contents, analysing them mainly from a theoretical and discursive perspective. 
The study does not focus on the pragmatic aspect of the policy documents; it 
does not try to link or explain how the selected policies were implemented 
and what sort of impact they have had on the ground. 
     Fourth, the study is primarily based on four important pieces of policy 
documents that were introduced between the years
20052 and 2013. Though informed of the past peace negotiations and policy 
initiatives, the study did not attempt to analyse them all. Instead it has 
remained focused on a limited period of time.       
     Finally, as the researcher was unable to travel to the country and gain a 
firsthand experience of the culture, everyday life and the ongoing peace 
process, all the information, assumptions, and tacit generalizations which are 
likely to be found in this thesis were based on secondary information and 
knowledge that the researcher grasped from different sources, mainly from the 
books and academic journals dealing with South Sudan, but also from the 
Internet, newspapers and by talking to a few South Sudanese acquaintances.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Though the CPA process already started in forms of different agreements in 2002, 
it culminated and was signed only in 2005.  
  
22 
Chapter I I 
 
Background   
 
Chapter I provided a short introduction of the study, presented main research 
questions, objectives and offered an explanation for research method, design 
and research data. This chapter focuses on a historical overview of the conflict 
that led to Southern Sudan’s independence. Causes and consequences of both 
first and second Sudanese wars have been briefly discussed. Issues surrounding 
the CPA, the 2011 referendum and outstanding issues in the wake of 
independence have also been discussed.  In addition, with the help of key 
development indicators and an analysis of humanitarian needs, South Sudan’s 
current socio-economic scenario is discussed.  
 
2.1 First Civil War (1955-1972) 
Colonialism and choices made by the colonialists have been attributed as one 
of the root causes of devastating civil wars in Sudan. From 1899 to 1955, 
southern Sudan was part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, jointly governed by 
the British-Egyptian rule. However, until 1946, northern Sudan and southern 
Sudan were treated and governed as separate regions. Many new development 
initiatives, such as extensive railway networks and a trained civil service, were 
introduced in the north, but the south remained virtually isolated. In 1922, the 
‘Passport and Permits Ordinance’ issued by the British, further isolated the 
south making it difficult for southerners to move. (Hoile 2002, p.27.)  
     The ‘Southern Policy’, introduced in 1930, further deepened the divisions, 
but the policy was ultimately reversed in 1946, and the colonialists urged that 
‘southern Sudan was inextricably bound to the Arabicized northern Sudan’ 
and the goal of the new policy was merely to ‘ensure that the southern 
Sudanese were equipped to stand up for themselves as social and economic 
equals of the northerners’ (Hoile 2002, p.27). 
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     The 1947 Juba Conference, organized by the British colonial 
administration and attended by representatives both from the South and 
North, envisioned a more developed southern Sudan ‘in the framework of a 
united Sudan’ (Hoile 2002, p.27).     
    This shift in British colonial strategy resulted in the merger of the two 
regions, but with devastating results. In 1953, Britain and Egypt agreed to 
grant independence to Sudan, but did not make any new arrangements for the 
future of southern Sudan. That meant when the British colonialists would 
leave, they would hand over the helms of administration to Arab Muslim 
elites, their close affinities, of the North. (Deng 1995, Jok 2007.) The British 
policy affected both sides, but differently. The southerners felt rejected as they 
were not consulted in the process, specially prior to the 1947 Juba conference, 
and feared subjugation from the North, whereas, the Northern elites saw this 
as an opportunity to impose their Arab values and traditions to non-Arab 
and non-Muslim Africans (Machar 2012, p.12).  
     Prior to independence of Sudan in 1956, The Liberal Party, a southern 
Sudanese political party formerly known as the Southern Party, passed a 
resolution, in October 1954, calling for a federal status with northern Sudan. 
The calls were not responded positively, and in the wake, an unrest was seen 
in the Nzara and Juba regions. In August 1955, southern Sudanese soldiers 
belonging to the Sudan Defence Force Equatorial corps mutinied in Torit, 
Juba, Yei and Maridi. (O’balance 1977, p.41.) The mutiny resulted in 261 
deaths of the northerners and the beginning of the Sudanese civil war (Hoile 
2002, p. 28). 
     The mutinies, however, were easily quashed and the subsequent eight years 
were just a matter of guerrilla survival. The insurgents organized themselves 
more effectively and, in 1993, southern students and the 1955 mutineers 
joined hands and formed the secessionist Anya-Nya movement (O’balance 
1977, p.57). In literal terms, Anya-Nya means snake venom in the south 
Sudanese Madi language (Wells & Samuel 1993). 
     The Anya-Nya rebel military movement founded in September 1963 and 
led by Emilio Tafeng as the commander-in-chief launched its first major 
military attack in barracks in Wau on 11 January 1964 (Hoile 2002, p. 29).  
     Amidst subsequent coup détats and regime change in the North and rifts 
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among tribal lines of the Anya-Nya movement in the South, the prospect for 
peaceful solution was nowhere to be seen. However, things started changing 
when, in May 1969, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiry overthrew the government of 
Mohammed Mahgoub in a bloodless coup. Nimeiry abolished all political 
parties and institutions, introduced socialist policies and, through a policy 
statement, recognized the ‘historical and cultural differences between the 
North and the South’outlining that the ‘Southern people have a right to 
develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan’ (Hoile 
2002, p.30). Shinn (2004) has argued that as Nimeiry had a weak power base 
in the North, he wanted to end the civil war and consolidate his political 
support in the South (p. 240).    
     On the other hand, having realized the drawbacks of the splits within the 
tribal lines of the Anya-Nya movement, Colonel Joseph Lagu, an Anya-Nya 
commander from Eastern Equatoria, brought together the dividing factions 
and founded a united force, which began to known as the SSLM or the 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (Yoh 2001, p. 29). Nimeiry’s vested 
political interest in the South and the unification within the Anya-Nya 
movement subsequently led to the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement.  
     Signed in 1972 in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, the Addis Ababa 
peace agreement ended the SSLM armed struggle and ensured a single 
southern administrative region, i.e. a regional autonomy, for the southerners 
(Yoh 2001, p. 29). Thereby, the agreement assured southern Sudan’s own 
legislative and executive organs, freedom of religious opinion, extensive grants 
for development, English as the ‘principal’ language for ‘Southern Region,’ 
and a new army command in the South that would consist 6000 ex Anya-
Nya soldiers and 6000 soldiers from the North (Shinn 2004, p. 242-243). 
     The Addis Ababa peace agreement offered a decade long relative peace, 
but ultimately it proved to be just a hiatus or merely a decade long ceasefire. 
Many factors have been proposed (see for instance Wakoson 1993, Malwal 
1981, Shinn 2004, Yoh 2001) as to why the Agreement couldn’t bring lasting 
peace in Sudan. 
     David H.Shinn, writing in 2004, notes that some of the most important 
provisions of the Agreement were never properly implemented. The Nimeiry 
administration did not show genuine interest in meaningfully integrating the 
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ex-Anya Nya soldiers into the Sudanese armed force, and the ones who were 
integrated were gradually retired, without replacing a substitute from the 
South (Shinn 2004, p.245). Second, the North wasn’t interested in providing 
enough funds to the South, as stipulated by the agreement. The small amount 
of funds that was received had to be spent on salaries of ex-Anya-Nya 
soldiers and the economic development of the South continued to be a distant 
dream for the southerners (Sylvester 1976, p. 183). 
     Situation worsened after the discovery of oil in 1978 by Chevron in 
different parts of the South (Alier 1992, p.244). After the discovery, the 
Northern government even put forward a proposal to redraw the boundary 
between the North and the South, with the aim of annexing oil reach areas to 
the North (Yoh 2001, p. 32). The Southerners were already frustrated by the 
continuous provocation, neglect and marginalization from the North, and the 
discovery of oil and virtual negation of the South only aggravated the already 
tensed situation (Alier 1992, Shinn 2004).  
     The government in the North didn’t consult the southerners on issues 
related to natural resources and their management, revenue distribution and 
other benefits. All the oil revenue generated from the oil fields in Southern 
Sudan went exclusively to the North and ‘Nimeiry could not accept the idea 
that revenue from natural resources come under the control of Southerners’ 
(Shinn 2004, p.249). In this way, as Wakoson argues, ‘the discovery of oil in 
the Southern Sudan created a political time-bomb’ (Wakoson 1993, p. 45). 
     Other factors, such as an increasing voice in the South for total 
independence, construction of the Jonglie canal in the South that provided 
irrigation to the North and water to Egypt, but practically nothing to the 
Southerners, consistent efforts to redraw the North-South boundary, and 
continuous interference in Southern politics from the North, worsened the 
situation so much that the relevance of the Addis Ababa agreement  remained 
only on paper (Shinn 2004, Yoh & Maloka 2005).  
      In addition, on 5 June 1983, President Nimeiry issued a presidential decree 
and divided the South into three small and separate regions, with capitals in 
Juba, Malakal and Wau (Yoh & Maloka 2005, p.32). The move was against 
the constitution and the Addis Ababa peace agreement, and a maneuver of the 
North to ‘divide the South along ethnic lines’ (Malwal 1981, p. 244) and to 
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‘undermine the political strength of a unified South’ (Shinn 2004, p. 253).   
     Finally, on 8 September 1983, Nimeiry declared the application of Islamic 
Sharia law throughout the country, including the Christian South (Wakoson 
1993, p.37). The announcement practically left no option for the Southerners 
than to take up arms against the North. In the wake, another bloody war 
engulfed the region. The following section elaborates upon the second 
Sudanese civil war that lasted for 22 years until the signing of another peace 
agreement in 2005.    
 
2.2 Second Civil War (1983-2005) 
Though it’s been generally mentioned that Sudan’s second civil war started in 
1983, after the revocation of the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement, Kim 
Deng, a South Sudanese military historian, has contested the notion. He has 
argued that there was a pocket of Anya-Nya I movement that doubted the 
implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement and decided to remain in the 
‘bush’ and reorganize themselves. They wanted a total separation from the 
North, not just an illusive self-determination. (Deng 2012.) 
     The seed to Second Civil War was sown already in 1975 when President 
Nimeiry tried to neutralize the power of Southern soldiers by transferring 
them to the North and sending Northern soldiers to the South. This caused 
sheer tension in the South and a significant number of soldiers mutinied in 
Akobo and, with their arms, fled to Ethiopia. This was the start of what later 
came to be known as Anya-Nya II movement. (Shinn 2004, p. 245.) 
     In 1983, similar tensions occurred in units of Southern battalion in Pibor, 
Bor and Pochalla. John Garang, a Southerner but a Lieutenant Colonel in the 
national army who later became the icon of the struggle and led the SPLM/A 
movement until his death in 2005, was sent to mediate the dispute. Garang 
himself sided with the mutineers, encountered the Northern army, and fled to 
Ethiopia with Southern troops. (Johnson 2003, p. 61-62.)  
     Some of the mutineers joined the fledgling Anya-Nya II movement, led by 
Lt. Col. Sammuel Gai Tut Yang, while the others joined the newly established 
Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Established in May 
1983, with around 2500 soldiers in Ethiopia and 500 soldiers in Bahr el-
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Ghazal region of Southern Sudan, the SPLM/A movement was initially led by 
Joseph Oduho and John Garang. However, when Joseph Oduho was deposed 
after a few months, Garang came to be SPLM/A’s only supreme leader. (Hoile 
2002 p.33-34, Johnson 2003, p.61-62.)   
     It is worth mentioning that the SPLM/A and the Anya-Nya II had a few 
fundamental differences. Anya-Nya II, dominated by the southern Sudanese 
Nuer tribe, wanted a total separation from the North, whereas, the SPLM/A, 
dominated by southern Sudanese Dinka tribe, envisaged a united, but socialist 
and secular Sudan, which was often referred as a New Sudan (Deng 2012). 
The SPLM/A maintained its desire for a united Sudan for a long time. In 1986, 
addressing his meeting with the National Alliance, John Garang declared: 
  
Brothers, as we have said many times before, we are not secessionists. 
And if anybody wants to separate even in the North, we will fight him 
because the Sudan must be one. We will maintain this opinion. 
(Garang 1986, cited in Khalid 1992, p.137).  
 
     Garang made similar remarks in October 1987 and emphasized that 
SPLM/A was fighting ‘a cultural, political and economic war’ that would lead 
to an annulment of national Islamic laws and pave the way for greater 
autonomy for all regions of Sudan (Garang 1987, cited in Hoile 2002, p. 40).   
     Since Anya-Nya II and the SPLM/A had major ideological and objective 
differences (i.e. separation vs. dignified unity), tensions started to arise. Battles 
erupted between the two factions and a few influential leaders of Anya-Nya II, 
such as William Abdullah Choul and Samuel Gai Tut, were killed by the 
SPLA soldiers (Deng 2012, Hoile 2002, p. 37). 
     Anya-Nya II could not compete with the SPLM/A and suffered a gradual 
disintegration. Some of its members joined the SPLM/A, whereas some chose 
to join government-supported militia groups (Wells & Samuel 1993). The 
remaining few formed a separate militia group known as the South Sudan 
Defense Forces, which somehow became an umbrella of anti-SPLM/A forces 
in the South (Young 2006, p.3).   
     Already in 1984, the Nimeiry government declared a state of emergency in 
Southern Sudan and tried to quash the rebellion by force.  However, the 
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SPLM/A kept on launching major attacks. Between 1984 and 1986, the SPLA 
soldiers halted the construction of the Jonglei canal, chased Chevron away 
from the South, started killing Baggara tribesmen, i.e. Arab nomads close to 
the north-south boundary, and went on to shoot down a civilian Sudan 
Airways aircraft killing sixty passengers and crew on board. (Hoile 2002, 34-
39.) 
     While the South was being ravaged by war, hunger and disease, the 
political melodrama continued in the North. In 1985, in another episode of 
coup d'état, in the wake of popular protests, President Nimeiry was deposed 
by General Abdel-Rahman Swar al-Dahab. As promised by the military ruler, 
elections were held within a year, and the Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi 
became Sudan’s new Prime Minister. (Fearon & Laitin 2006, p. 19.)  
     Unlike Nimeiry, elected leader al-Mahdi showed some interest in peace 
talks with the SPLM/A. The rebels had been rejecting any prospect of 
dialogue with Nimeiry’s government, but agreed to engage in talks with the 
al-Mahdi administration. In January 1987, the Sudanese government and the 
SPLM/A rebels met for talks in London. However, the talks failed as the 
government took the rebels merely as secessionists; thereby willing to grant 
certain autonomy to the South, but the rebels were firm to their demand of a 
New Sudan. For the government, SPLM/A was a Southern problem, whereas, 
the rebels defined their struggle as a national issue that affected the entire 
Sudan. (Hoile 2002, p.40-43.) Islamic Sharia law was another major issue. 
While senior army officers and a faction of the ruling coalition were ready to 
give up Sharia for peace, the National Islamic Front (NIF) rejected the idea 
(Metz 1991, p.59-60).    
     While efforts for further talks were underway, Sudan went through 
another political change in 1989. On 30 June that year, there was another 
military coup d’état, supported by Muslim Brotherhood, that overthrew 
elected Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, abolished the post of Prime Minister 
altogether and a new military Colonel, Omer al-Bashir took the helms of the 
country (Fearon & Laitin 2006, p. 19).  
     The Bashir government, which was called the Revolutionary Command 
Council for National Salvation (RCC), suspended the 1986 transitional 
constitution and introduced harsh rules and regulations to impose the Sharia 
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law, but also to strengthen its grip on power. The RCC banned all political 
parties, trade unions, human rights organizations and any other institutions 
that were ‘non-Islamic’ in nature. More than 3000 army officers were sacked 
from their job for not cooperating well during the imposition of Sharia 
(Kebbede 1997, p.30). Bashir’s insistence to seek a military solution to the 
conflict and his decision to impose Sharia even to the non-Muslim South 
escalated the conflict (Metz 1991, p. 60).   
      A new penal code, The Criminal Act of 1991, was introduced to Islamize 
the legal system. The Act allowed inhumane punishments like stoning and 
amputations. Two years later, non-Muslim judges from the South were 
replaced with Muslim judges from the North. Teachers, doctors, lawyers and 
other professionals not paying heed to the regime were sacked and replaced 
with NIF staunches. (Kebbede 1997.) 
     In her 1997 portrayal of the initial offences of the Bashir regime, Girma 
Kebbede writes:     
[The regime] obtained new weapons from Iran and Libya (both 
supplied jet fighters used to bomb civilians in the South). Iran also 
paid for Chinese light weapons, ammunitions, tanks and artillery 
shells. With fresh supplies of sophisticated military weapons and using 
local Arab militias as a proxy army, its armed forces achieved major 
victories during 1992, and regained nearly all the garrison towns they 
had lost in previous encounters. (Kebbede 1997, p.30.) 
 
     In mid 1991, while the Bashir administration was devising new offensives 
against the SPLM/A, the movement suffered another blow due to Mengistu 
regime’s collapse in Ethiopia. Since the 1980s, the communist regime of 
Colonel Mengistu had been providing direct military aid to SPLM/A 
(Kebedde 1997, p. 38), and for a short period of time SPLA soldiers even 
fought to defend the Mengistu government (Hoile 2002, p. 44).   
     Collapse of the Mengistu regime and extreme aggression from the North 
created tensions within the SPLM/A movement. Once again the movement 
got divided into the lines of unionists and secessionists. Overt secessionist 
SPLM/A field commanders; like Dr Riek Machar, Dr Lam Akol and Gordon 
Kong, based in the Nasir region, issued a statement demanding the removal of 
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John Garang as SPLM commander. They called Garang a ‘dictator’ and 
slammed SPLM/A’s support to Mengistu; its Dinka domination and poor 
human rights records. In August 1991, the dissidents separated from the 
mainstream SPLM/A and formed SPLA-Nasir. Though it wasn’t officially 
renamed, after the split, the SPLM/A led by Garang came to be known as 
SPLM/A-Torit or SPLM/A-Mainstream. (Deng 1995, Hoile 2002.)  
     The mainstream SPLM/A suffered another fragmentation when Garang’s 
deputy William Nyoun defected and formed SPLA-Unity, later joining with 
SPLA-Nasir and forming SPLA-United in March 1993. The SPLA-United 
went through another division when Dr Machar formed the South Sudan 
Independence Movement (SSIM) and Dr Akol became the commander of 
SPLA-United. (Johnson 2003, p.90-97.) 
     The severe split within the SPLM/A resulted in fierce fighting between the 
different factions of the movement. For instance, in 1992, only in the Kongor 
and Waat areas, the fighting between SPLA-Mainstream and SPLA-Unity left 
more than 2,000 people dead (Hoile 2002, p. 45). 
     However, when it started becoming clear that the defected factions had 
been receiving military support from the government in Khartoum (Rone 2003, 
p.14-15) their popularity in the South plummeted. Eventually, the Nasir 
faction signed the 1997 Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government and 
Riek Machar became an assistant to Omar el Bashir and was appointed as 
president of the Southern States Coordination Council (SSCC). He went on to 
form another political party, United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) and 
became commander-in-chief of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), 
which was mainly fighting against the SPLM/A. (Jonhson 2003, p. 95-99, 
Rone 2003 p. 14-16.)  
     Amidst SPLM/A’s internal rifts and Khartoum government’s determination 
to quash the movement with force, initial peace talks carried out with the 
mainstream SPLM/A, such as Nairobi and Addis Ababa (1989) and Abuja 
talks (1992-1993), miserably failed.  
     Writing in 1997, Girma Kabedde argues that though SPLM/A’s own 
internal problems and weakening strength contributed to the negative 
outcome of peace talks, the major factor, however, was the Northern 
government’s strategy to Islamize the South by any means (p.42). They even 
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believed that ‘the North had a moral responsibility to Islamize the South and 
reverse the colonial legacy of Christian influence in the region’ (Kebedde 1997, 
p.42).  
 
2.3 The 2005 Peace Agreement  
Earlier attempts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict went in vain mainly 
because the warring parties were not ready to retreat from their positions. On 
the other hand, the interests of the mediators also affected the peace talks. For 
instance, the 1992-1993 Abuja talks failed also because Nigeria itself 
wouldn’t be willing to engage in the issue of secession and self-determination 
as it would leave a precedent and that wouldn’t be very favorable for 
Nigeria’s own interest. The 1999-2001 Egypt-Libya initiatives, allegedly, 
were inspired because Africans dominated the ongoing peace process and an 
Arab perspective was deemed to be missing. Egypt was particularly concerned 
because of its enormous interest in Sudan, mainly for the Nile water, but also 
the burgeoning political Islam was a matter of concern for both countries. 
(Rogier 2005, p. 6.)  
     After the 1992-93 Abuja talks failed, John Garang announced that, in 
cooperation with northern opposition parties, he would take the war to North 
by forming a new force, the New Sudan Brigade (Hoile 2002, p. 51).  
     Under the auspices of the Inter-governmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD), which includes the governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia and Sudan; peace negotiations were once again initiated by late 1993 
and intensified by early 1994. IGAD achieved its first breakthrough by 
introducing Declaration of Principles that incorporated self-determination 
and secularism for Sudan as core principles for peace talks; something the 
SPLM/A had been advocating for. Though the SPLM/A immediately accepted 
the Principles, GoS rejected them outright and left the negotiating table for 
three years. (Rogier 2005, p.40.) After the peace talks failed, both parties 
sought to win over militarily.  
     After widespread regional and international pressure, in 1997, the 
Sudanese government, however, accepted with reservation, the IGAD 
Declaration of Principles as the basis for dialogue. Rounds of discussions were 
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held in Nairobi and Addis Ababa for almost two years. The talks often 
faltered on the issue of secularism, but also due to disagreement over what is 
constituted as southern Sudan. The talks in August 1998 couldn’t progress 
because SPLM/A’s bottom line was a confederal system, whereas GoS 
wouldn’t go for more than a federal set up. (Hoile 2002 p. 78.)  
     In April 1999, the Sudanese government suspended all peace talks and 
retreated from the peace process. This has been attributed to the fact that 
since Ethiopia and Eritrea engaged in their own border war and Uganda’s 
attention was shifted towards the new conflicts emerging in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sudanese peace process received very little 
attention from IGAD members. At least till mid 2001, the prospect for peace 
in Sudan was minimal. (Rogier 2005 p.45.)  
     The situation improved dramatically over the next few months and in July 
2002; the warring parties signed the Machakos Protocol. Negotiations, 
however, were extremely difficult and the chief negotiator even ‘locked two 
members of each delegation in a room and told them this was their last 
chance’ (Rolandsen 2011, p.556).  
     The Machakos Protocol ensured Sharia law in the North and self-
determination for the South. It also guaranteed referendum for the future of 
Southern Sudan and envisioned a united, better Sudan. However, as the 
protocol only called for a negotiation and implementation of a comprehensive 
cease-fire (p.3), it didn’t immediately stop belligerencies. 
     The Machakos Protocol suffered a blow when the SPLA attacked on the 
Southern town of Torit. The GoS left the peace talks and demanded an 
immediate ceasefire. By the beginning of 2003, however, the derailed peace 
process came back to track and despite occasional skirmishes, by and large, 
the process succeeded and concluded with the groundbreaking CPA in 
January 2005. (Rolandsen 2011, p.556.)    
     In a nutshell, the peace process that reached a landmark in the form of the 
CPA in 2005 had the following arrangements:  
- Self-determination to the people of Southern Sudan through a 
referendum 
- Right to formulate legislations based on Sharia for the North  
- The North-South border is that of January 1956 as incorporated in the 
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Declaration of Principles adopted by IGAD 
- An interim period of six years before the referendum 
- During the interim period, a semi-independent rule in the South; in the 
legislature of the South with 70% SPLM, 15% NCP, and 15% other 
political forces in the South 
- In the national assembly 52% of the seats to NCP, 28% to SPLM, 14% 
to other northern parties, 6% to other southern parties 
- Special arrangements in some form of self-autonomy to disputed 
regions of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Special commissions 
to define boundaries of disputed areas and conduct referendum in 
Abyei 
- Wealth sharing: oil revenues obtained from oil fields in the South to be 
divided 50% each, after giving 2% to the producing areas  
- The national government, the government in the South and state 
governments entitled to legislate, raise and collect taxes 
- The security arrangements: two armies, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) 
and SPLA, to continue as separate forces, however, Joint Integrated 
Units (39000 soldiers) to be formed from SAF and SPLA and be 
stationed in the South, southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Khartoum 
                                  (Abdin 2012, Rolandsen 2011, the CPA 2005)   
 
 
 
2.4 Factors that Led to Peace Agreement  
Many factors have been attributed as possible reasons that compelled the 
warring parties to be serious about the peace talks and find a peaceful 
solution.  
     Hilde Johnson, then Norway’s Minister for International Development and 
a peace talk facilitator, recalls in her 2011 memoir that the peace talks were 
possible because both the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government came to 
realize that a military victory was not a viable option (p.3). She also sees the 
role of the international community, specially the Troika consisting the US, 
UK and Norway, to be crucial and commends profound negotiating skills of 
the Kenyan negotiators (ibid). 
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     In a more comprehensive analysis, Rogier (2005) argues that, more than 
just mere war fatigue; there were at least four other factors that exerted 
pressure on both SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan and ultimately led to 
successful peace talks.  
     First, the US involvement in Sudan in the post 9/11 scenario was 
significantly different. The US wasn’t concerned that much when 
democratically elected government of Sadiq-al-Mahdi was overthrown in a 
military coup, but when the new regime was inclined towards Iraq in the Gulf 
war, formed strong ties with Iran, allegedly hosted terrorist groups and was 
committing war crimes in the South; the US wanted to overthrow or weaken 
the Islamist regime in Sudan.  
     Second, especially when the hardline ideological leader Hassan al-Turabi 
lost his grip on power and Sudan was virtually isolated by the international 
community; the Sudanese government itself was interested in improving its 
relationship with the United States and wanted to join the fight against 
international terrorism in the wake of ‘9/11’ attacks.   
     Third, the SPLM/A garnered more political and military strength when it 
reconciled with the Sudan People's Defense Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF), 
led by Riek Machar. SPDF was a faction separated from the SPLM/A-
Mainstream in 1991. However, even after (re)unification, they realized that, 
military victory was not at sight, the government still had access to oil 
revenues and could keep on purchasing weapons, the regional support was 
fading and the demand for peace was widespread. These factors convinced the 
SPLM/A to join the peace talks and take them seriously. 
     In addition, when the US appointed Senator Danforth as a Special Envoy 
for Peace in the Sudan and adopted The Sudan Peace Act, allowing further 
sanctions and even indicating possible use of military force against Khartoum, 
that apparently exerted pressure on Bashir’s administration in Khartoum 
(Cockett 2010, p. 162–164). Finally, it has been also acknowledged that 
Kenyan President Daniel Moi’s determination to revive the IGAD process and 
the exceptional negotiation skills of the negotiating team led by the Kenyan 
General Lazarus Sumbeiywo were also found to be instrumental in finding a 
peaceful end to the conflict (Rogier 2005, p.45).      
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2.5 Main Causes of North- South Conflict  
As explained in the examples and arguments presented above, the dynamics of 
conflict in South Sudan clearly seem to be of two dimensional. First, there was 
and still is, though not always overt and belligerent, conflict with the North; 
and second, there was and is conflict between southern factions and ethnic 
groups within South Sudan. Different scholars propose different reasons for 
such conflicts, and many of them can be divided into two main categories.  
     First proposition is that of ethno-sectarian grievances, i.e. the conflict with 
the North, or within the South, is caused by historically unaddressed 
grievances of the marginalized, exploited and disempowered minorities, 
whereas, the second proposition is that of greed, i.e. conflicts between or in 
Sudan/South Sudan are driven by the greed of natural resources, primarily the 
oil, in the South.   
     Until South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Sudan was a country with two 
identities: African and Arab. Some scholars (such as Deng 1995, Jok 2007, 
Wai 1981) argue that ethno-sectarian differences between African 
Christians/Animists and Muslim Arabs is the root cause of the North-South 
conflict that manifested during First and Second Sudanese civil wars. 
Proponents of this notion see the conflict as a resistance movement against an 
authoritative Muslim government that sought to impose Sharia laws and 
aimed at Islamilizing its population by any means (Tibi 2008, p. 33). Salman 
M.A. Salman (2013) observes that ‘the ethnic, religious, linguistic, and 
cultural differences and diversity that are usually a source of strength for 
nations were Sudan’s weakness’ (p. 410). He further argues that ‘the sense of 
the superiority of the Arab-Islamic culture dominated the thinking and 
actions of all the Northern political leaders, and Southern Sudan was simply a 
cultural vacuum to be filled by Northern Sudan’s values and norms’ (ibid). 
     In his 2012 study, Perceptions and Voices of South Sudanese About the 
North-South Sudan Conflict, Machar Wek Aleu-Baak, a South Sudanese, 
argues that many South Sudanese perceive the conflict as a clash between 
Muslim North versus Christian South; a fight between two cultural and 
religious identities where national identity was of second priority. Reflecting 
upon his own experiences, he states:   
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When I was a little boy growing up in Southern Sudan, my parents 
taught me to identify myself as an African Christian and Animist. In 
early childhood, I began to understand that Sudan was home for two 
different peoples: African Christians and Animists and Arab Muslims. 
I was told that Africans live in Southern Sudan and Arabs live in 
Northern Sudan. I learned about various historical conflicts between 
my ancestors and those of Arabs. This fighting took place in cattle 
camps, at schools, in the markets, on buses, at work, and over 
political issues...These memories are heartbreaking: millions of deaths, 
cultures and properties lost, and thousands displaced into foreign 
lands.  (Machar 2012, p.4-5.) 
 
Another school of thought has been that of greed; natural resources, primarily 
oil, but also water, fertile land, cattle and other natural resources in the South. 
The issue of human resources, human trafficking and slavery, doesn’t seem to  
be  usually linked to the idea of ‘resources’, but often as a byproduct of war. 
However, human trafficking and slave trade can sufficiently be linked to the 
resource issue as well. South Sudanese war literature is full of slave stories that 
were exploited, exported and tortured in the North.  
 
It is estimated that as many as 200,000 Southern Sudanese and Nuba 
children and women have been taken into slavery from Southern 
Sudanese towns and villages during the war. Both the government 
regular armed forces and notorious militia (known as the People's 
Defense Forces, PDF) were used to attack and raid villages in the 
South and the Nuba Mountains for slaves and cattle. (Alley, 2001.) 
 
     The greed discourse has been attributed to both warring parties: the rebels 
and the Sudanese government. First, the greedy North that eyes the resources 
in the South, but also the southern elites who seek to benefit from the 
resources and use war as a means of fulfillig their vested interests. Also the 
idea that groups rebel when rebellion is financially viable (See Collier & 
Hoeffler 2002) has often been presented to link the conflict with resources and 
economic opportunities.   
     As stated above, oil discovery in 1978 in the Unity State and subsequent 
discoveries in different parts of southern Sudan has been linked to origination 
and exacerbation of the conflict. Jemera Rone, in a 2003 study commissioned 
by the international human rights organization Human Rights Watch, argues 
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that oil was ‘the main objective and principal cause’ of the conflict in Sudan. 
She claims that oil was not only the principal cause, but also became an 
‘important obstacle to a lasting peace’ as oil revenues were ‘used by the 
government to obtain weapons and ammunition that intensified the 
war’.(Rone 2003, p. 36.) She further argues that ‘expansion of oil 
development has continued to be accompanied by the violent displacement of 
the agro-pastoral southern Nuer and Dinka people from their traditional 
lands atop the oilfields’ (ibid). Similarly, Haile (2012) argues that the greed 
versus grievances discourse can be understood in relation to post-
independence conflict within South Sudan as well. She observes that a 
majority of rebel group which have mushroomed in the wake of independence 
are mostly active in oil rich states; and they use ‘various grievances, such as 
rising inflation, corruption, nepotism, tribalism, inequality, and high 
unemployment’ just to garner public support and justify violence (Haile 2012, 
p.2).  
     Some scholars, however, refrain from splitting the conflict into two distinct 
poles and rather choose to offer alternative explanations, demonstrating a 
more complex picture of the conflict. A widely cited author and an expert in 
Sudan-South Sudan issues, Douglas Johnson, argues that the causes of the 
North-South conflict in Sudan are both multiple and deep. Moving beyond 
the religion-resources or greed-grievances factors, though not rejecting them 
altogether, he sees the conflict as a tussle between an exploitative center and a 
neglected periphery. He also outlines international politics, Cold war, post 
9/11 global terrorism debate constantly affecting the dynamics of the conflict 
(Johnson 2003). In a similar observation, Aleksi Ylönen argues that the 
rebellion is not guided by the economic opportunity, but rather by ‘socio-
economic grievances derived from culturally and regionally imposed political 
marginalisation, which require broader analysis’ (Ylönen 2005, p.100). 
     Obviously, though some factors seem to have contributed more, there is 
no single explanation for the four decades of conflict in Sudan. Though the 
main and manifested factors seem to be that of cultural clashes, tumultuous 
center-periphery relations and the greed for natural resources, other 
narratives, often subtle and shaped by people’s own experiences during the 
conflict have emerged and they certainly deserve a thorough attention and 
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explanation.  
 
2.6 Consequences of the Conflict  
The protracted conflict that started in 1955; though with a brief hiatus in 
between 1972-82, was one of Africa’s bloodiest and longest civil wars. More 
than half a million people lost their lives during the first civil war that lasted 
for over 17 years.    
     The Second Sudanese civil war that started in 1983 was worse than the 
first one in terms of death toll, displacement, and human suffering. During 22 
years of violent conflict, more than 2 million people died, mostly in southern 
Sudan. The figure is contested; some propose that the actual death toll could 
have exceeded three million. In addition, more than 4.8 million people were 
internally displaced. As the war destroyed livelihood opportunities and safety 
mechanisms, more than 0.8 million people went into exile. (Ahmed 2008, 
Sharkey 2004, SSPRC 2013, p. 9.)  
     The Sudanese economy was severely affected as the cost of operating war 
went up to $2 million a day (Kebedde 1997, p.42). A Human Rights Watch 
report in 2003 found that many deaths in Sudan’s conflict occurred not 
merely due to war bullets and overt belligerency, but also because of pervasive 
hunger, rampant diseases, widespread rape, torture and slavery (p. 39-42).   
     While excessive force used by the government in the North was one reason 
for acute suffering; many factors within the South also contributed to it. 
Many deaths occurred during inter-tribal fighting, cattle raids, revenge and 
forced conscription. Both SPLA and SSIM had poor human rights records and 
forced conscription of child soldiers was a common practice (Hoile 2002, p. 
52).  
     Harrowing accounts of human suffering have been widely recorded in 
different reports and literature that emerged during and after the conflict. The 
following excerpt from a 1996 report by the UN Special Rapporteur, Gaspar 
Biro, describes a violent attack carried out by the SPLA soldiers in July 1995:    
 
Eyewitnesses reported that some of the victims, mostly women, 
children and the elderly, were caught while trying to escape and killed 
with spears and pangas. M.N., a member of the World Food 
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Programme relief committee at Panyajor, lost four of her five children 
(aged 8-15 years). The youngest child was thrown into the fire after 
being shot. D.K. witnessed three women with their babies being 
caught. Two of the women were shot and one was killed with a panga. 
Their babies were all killed with pangas. A total of 1,987 households 
were reported destroyed and looted and 3, 500 cattle were taken. 
Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, UN Special Rapporteur Gaspar Biro, 
E/CN.4/1996/62, 20 February 1996 (cited in Hoile 2002, p. 53) 
 
In a 1996 article published in the New York Times Magazine, reporter Bill 
Berkerly made similar remarks:  
In far-flung scorched-earth sweeps, minimally trained, totally 
illiterate, heavily armed fighters torch villages, steal the livestock and 
food, plant land mines, conscript the young men and boys and rape 
the women and girls. Garang’ s explicit strategy was to render south 
Sudan ungovernable, and in that he succeeded. The south today is not 
only ungovernable but virtually uninhabitable. (Berkeley 1996.)  
 
The extent of human suffering has somehow decreased in the post-
independence scenario; but South Sudan still grapples with a number of 
challenges that involve violent incidences, numerous deaths and mass 
displacements.  
 
2.7 The CPA Implementation and 2011 Referendum  
The CPA implementation proved to be a sheer challenge when the SPLM/A 
supreme leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash only after 6 months of 
signing the agreement. Hilde Johnson, in her memoir, mentions that when the 
IGAD supported talks were in the verge of collapse in 2004, John Garang and 
Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha took the helm of the process and 
many compromises were possible due to close negotiations between the two 
(Johnson 2011).  
     Though the crash was reportedly caused by bad weather conditions, 
Garang’s sudden death caused sheer suspicion and mistrust between the two 
sides.  Clashes erupted in different parts of Sudan; and Khartoum was under 
curfew for many days. In addition to Garang’s void, there were other issues 
that made the CPA implementation a daunting challenge. Sharing and 
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management of oil revenues, unfulfilled (aid) promises of the international 
community, US sanctions against the North, border issues, the referendum 
laws for the South and Abyei all caused tensions to the point that at one point 
SPLM/A even left the Government of National Unity and parliament. (Abdin 
2012.)  Young (2007) argues that government-supported militias in the South 
also affected smooth implementation of the CPA.       
     Despite these hurdles and despite the fact that some issues of disputes were 
postponed for discussion in post-referendum period, a referendum took place 
in Southern Sudan from 9-15 January 2011. Southern Sudanese living in the 
North and in diaspora also voted. On 7 February 2011 it was announced that 
98.83% of Southern Sudanese voted in favor of secession. On 9 July 2011, 
South Sudan was declared independent in a spectacular ceremony attained by 
many world leaders (Sudan Tribune 2011).    
 
2.8 Post-Secession Tension and Outstanding Issues  
Even after secession, the relations between Sudan and South Sudan have been 
filled with tensions and mutual mistrust. The Heglig border conflict that 
erupted in March 2012 claimed hundreds of lives from both sides. In another 
move, South Sudan decided to shut down oil production altogether after a 
row over transport fees. Despite vast reserves of oil, South Sudan doesn’t have 
its own refinery and transport mechanism and is dependent on the North. As 
the stoppage badly hit both economies, the dispute was settled after 16 
months, through a series of negotiations. Khartoum and Juba still accuse each 
other of supporting insurgent militias in their territories. (Ndukong 2013.) 
    As of June 2014, some issues, such as that of oil, have been settled, but 
there are other partially settled or unsettled issues. Up to 70% of border 
demarcation has been agreed, but tensions remain in some areas. According to 
the CPA, a popular consultation should have taken place already in 2011 to 
determine the future of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, but they have been 
indefinitely postponed. These disputed regions are in the Sudanese map, but 
due to their cultural intimacy to the South and also the fact that the residents 
of these states supported the independence movement and fought along with 
the SPLM/A, the desire to remain with the South is immense. (Ndukong 
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2013.)  
     The situation in another disputed oil rich region of Abyei has been even 
more serious. The CPA stipulated that a simultaneous referendum with the 
2011 Southern Sudan referendum would finalize the future of Abyei, but due 
to mounting tensions and sheer disagreement; no referendum has been 
organized yet. Violent clashes have been frequently reported in the disputed 
regions and an African Union High Level committee has been negotiating to 
end the impasse. The main disagreement has been over the issue of who is 
entitled to vote in a possible referendum. South Sudan wants that the voting 
rights should only be given to permanently residing Dinka Ngok tribes, 
however, Sudan also insists on including Arab Misseriya nomads who spend 
6-9 months a year in the territory (Abdin 2012).   
     As close interdependent neighbors with a mutually shared bitter past, the 
way forward is not easy for both countries. Nevertheless, amidst widespread 
suspicion, mistrust and paranoia, the door to dialogue has remained open and 
many issues have been, in fact, solved. However, Sudan-South Sudan 
relations still remain fragile and volatile and seem to pose threat to sustainable 
peace in the region.  
 
2.9 Fragile Peace and Internal Tensions within 
South Sudan   
South Sudan still maintains hostilities with its neighbor in the North on 
several issues, but tensions within South Sudan have become even more 
challenging in recent months.  
     A series of armed rebellions, such as the National United Front and the 
South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) led by former SPLA General George 
Athor, emerged shortly after the independence. Though incapable of toppling 
the ruling regime, these rebellions destabilized regional security and caused 
continuous civilian suffering. Majority of such groups are led by former SPLA 
commanders and basically aim at fulfilling their vested interests. (Haile 2012). 
     A more serious conflict has erupted since December 2013 after the ruling 
party tussle turned violent on the evening of 15 December in a party meeting. 
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Fighting started initially among members of the Presidential Guard and the 
SPLA split between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and former 
Vice-President  Riek Machar, a Nuer. Fighting rapidly spread to various 
military joints and within less than 24 hours civilian lives were caught in the 
violence. (UNMISS 2014.)    
     The SPLA suffered disintegration in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States 
and the capitals of these states were under control of the opposition forces.  
 
In Jonglei State, when opposition forces initially took Bor town, 
civilians fled and, according to local authorities, more than 300 
civilians, mainly women and children, died while trying to cross the 
river into Lakes State (UNMISS 2014, p.3).  
 
The 12 days of intense fighting claimed numerous3 lives and according to the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the 
conflict has displaced ‘estimated 743,400 people inside South Sudan and 
another 130,400 people have fled to neighboring countries’ (UNOCHA 2014). 
A 2014 report released by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan accused 
both warring parties of extrajudicial killing and war crime.   
    
Reports of widespread killing of hundreds of civilians, destruction of 
entire villages, and looting of livestock, food items, and other personal 
possessions were received...The consequences for the civilian 
population have been devastating. There have been attacks on 
hospitals, churches, mosques, and United Nations bases. All parties to 
the conflict have committed acts of rape and other forms of sexual 
violence against women of different ethnic groups...Despite the signing 
of a cessation of hostilities agreement on 23 January, fighting 
continues with little hope that civilians will see any respite from the 
relentless violence...there are also reasonable grounds to believe that 
the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and other acts of sexual 
violence, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment have occurred. 
(UNMISS 2014, p. 2-3). 
 
In May 2014, President Kiir and the defected leader Machar signed another 
ceasefire in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, but the agreement was violated 
                                                
3 The actual death toll is unclear as no confirmed official  number has been provided so far. 
On 26 December, Hilde Johnson, head of the U.N. mission in South Sudan, estimated that 
well over 1,000 people had died, whereas, the International Crisis Group in January 2014 
estimated that up to 10000 people might have died as a result of the conflict.  
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within hours of promulgation. In June 2014, talks on the formation of a 
transitional government have started and as agreed, the parties should have 
refrained from hostilities during the talks, but the talks have been often 
boycotted by both sides and the ceasefire has reported to be violated (Sudan 
tribune 2014).  
     According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2014, put together by the 
Institute for Economics and Peace, South Sudan experienced the largest drop 
(of 17 spots as compared to 2013) and now ranks as the third least peaceful 
country in the world after Syria and Afghanistan (IEP 2014).  
  
2.10 Key Development Indicators and 
Humanitarian Catastrophe  
Ravaged by decades of war, oppression and marginalization, South Sudan has 
some of the worst social and human development indicators in the world. In a 
2012 interview, Lise Grande, the UNDP Resident and Humanitarian 
Coordinator for South Sudan elucidates the gravity of the situation: 
 
[In South Sudan] More than 90 per cent of women can’t read or write. 
A 15-year-old girl has a higher chance of dying from pregnancy-
related causes than finishing school. Out of the world’s 13 deadly 
diseases, 12 of them are in South Sudan. In fact, the highest maternal 
mortality rate anywhere in the world is in South Sudan. (Grande, 
2012.)  
 
Previously estimated to be 8.26 million, South Sudan’s population now is 
estimated to be 8.26 million due to influx of South Sudanese returnees and 
refugees escaping the conflict in neighboring Sudan (OCHA, 2014).      
     In 2013, Fund for Peace, a US based think-tank, placed South Sudan on 
number 4 of its Failed States Index and the country remains one of the least 
developed countries in the world; more than half the country’s population 
living below the poverty line (Oxfam et al. 2011, p.3).   
     According to a 2012 report published by the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), the official statistics agency of the Government of South Sudan, the 
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country’s area is 644,329 sq. km, roughly the size of France, and more than 
half of the population is below the age of eighteen. The report further 
highlights that 72% of the population is below the age of thirty and merely 
27% of the adult population is literate. Largely an agrarian society, more than 
83% of the population lives in villages practicing subsistence agriculture.  
     As a legacy of decades of violence and instability, South Sudan grapples 
with dilapidated infrastructures and a devastated public health system. 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, as of 2012, barely 7.4% of the 
population has access to improved sanitation (NBS 2012, p.1-3, SHHS 2010). 
More strikingly, ICRC in July 2012 reported that South Sudan has about 120 
medical doctors and just over 100 nurses for an estimated population of 
nearly nine million people (ICRC 2012). According to the 2010 South Sudan 
Household Health Survey, life expectancy of South Sudanese people stood at 
mere 42 years and only 6% of children aged 12-23 months received proper 
immunization (SHHS 2010, NBS 2012, p.7).  
     South Sudan is a landlocked country sharing borders with Sudan, Uganda, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. More than 60 ethnic indigenous groups, major ethnicities being the 
Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Murle and Bari, inhabit the country (NBS 2012).  
     Religious composition of the country has often been contested.  Recent 
statistical reports published by the South Sudanese National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) do not provide any data on religion. Some scholarly works 
argue that a majority of southern Sudanese follow indigenous, often referred 
to as Animist, beliefs (Kaufmann 2004, p. 45, Minahan 2002), however, the 
most recent report published by Pew Research Centre on Religion and Public 
Life estimates that, as of 2010, more than 60% of South Sudanese are 
Christians, whereas, about 33% follow African indigenous faiths and about 
6.2% practice Islam (PewResearch, 2012).   
     South Sudan’s economy is primarily based on oil exports and subsistence 
agriculture. Nearly 98% of South Sudan’s budget revenues come from oil 
(NBS 2012, p.5). As of 2012, the country had just 80 km of paved roads, and 
when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) helped 
construct a 192 km long Juba-Nimule Road, that was hailed as the largest 
infrastructure project ever built in South Sudan (USAID 2012).  
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     South Sudan annually receives a substantial amount of international aid. 
For instance, the country’s 2012-2013 budget of US$3bn was supplemented 
by US$ 1 billion of development assistance, and additional US$ 300 million of 
international humanitarian assistance (World Bank 2013).  
 
 
2.11 Recent Studies on Peacebuilding in South 
Sudan  
The North-South conflict in Sudan has grabbed significant academic 
attention over the years, partly because the conflict lasted for decades and 
caused devastating consequences. However, despite the fact that there is 
ample academic literature available on causes, consequences and different 
dynamics of the conflict, the volume of literature dealing with post-
secession/post-conflict peacebuilding policy issues and transitional justice 
mechanisms is rather thin. Nonetheless, a few studies that have emerged in the 
wake of independence have been briefly and critically discussed below. 
     One of the policy documents that have received significant academic 
attention is the CPA.  The peace process itself and the CPA both have been 
defended and criticized by researchers. The ones defending the 2005 peace 
deal (for instance Rolandsen 2011) argue that since there was no better 
alternative to coming to the negotiating table and end the war, despite its 
limitations, the peace process envisioned by the CPA and the 2011 referendum, 
was a prudent move. On the other hand, the ones criticizing the process (such 
as Ylönen 2012, Nwanegbo & Odigbo 2013) emphasize that the peace 
negotiation and subsequent arrangements couldn’t really be comprehensive in 
nature and the threat of future belligerencies and rebound to conflict cannot 
be ruled out.  
     Writing in 2011, the Norwegian peace researcher Øystein H. Rolandsen 
argues that though ‘the CPA did not include other political parties, solve 
conflicts elsewhere in Sudan, or provide a blueprint for democratisation and 
economic development,’ it did, however, ‘brought a halt to the conflict 
between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A’ (Rolandsen 2011, p.561-
562). In addition, he stresses that the CPA process ‘laid the foundation for 
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change and development, but other processes are needed to realise these 
aspirations’ (ibid). 
     Many researchers, however, have criticized this type of utilitarian way of 
looking at the peace process. For instance, writing in late 2012, Aleksi Ylönen 
argues that the CPA was indeed an exclusive deal between the SPLM/A and 
GoS and there are other strong factions who oppose it (p.29). In addition, he 
argues that the South Sudanese approach to peacebuilding has been riddled 
with the ‘Western-led liberal discourse’ that seeks to achieve ‘peace through 
state-building’, but not necessarily through development and good 
governance. Ylönen asserts that ‘reorientation of the approach to peace, 
governance and development in South Sudan is necessary if the Africa’s 
newest state is to become viable and stable political entity in the long term’ (p. 
29).   
     In his 2012 study Negotiating Statehood in the Republic of South Sudan, 
Agnes Koppelman makes similar remarks regarding the exclusivity of the 
SPLM/A as the most powerful force that is hardly distinguishable from GoSS 
(p.43). He observes that with its legacy of leading the independence movement, 
SPLM/A is the biggest and strongest political force in the country and that has 
narrowed down the growth space for other political forces, heavily 
compromising the idea of democratic competition and participation (ibid).   
     In another 2013 study Post-Independence Peacebuilding in South Sudan: 
Looking Beyond Ephemeral Peace, Nwanegbo & Odigbo argue that South 
Sudan, in the wake of independence, has multiple challenges to peacebuilding 
that range from peaceful border demarcation between Sudan and South Sudan 
to rehabilitation of ex-combatants (p.9). They also raise the issue of 
transitional justice and argue that mere independence does not lead to peace 
per se; and ‘failing to deal adequately with transitional justice issues will be 
very costly over the long term’ (p.3).  
     There are a few other recent studies that rather focus on how different 
approaches to peacebuilding could be useful in the South Sudanese context 
and, at the same time, try to map out different, often neglected, stakeholders 
that are important for sustainable peacebuilding in the country.  
     One such study conducted by Da Costa & Karlsrud (2012) emphasizes 
that getting engaged with local customary authorities is vital in peacebuilding 
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as government authorities may not necessarily represent the communities of 
their official jurisdiction (p.51). Brown (2008) observes that as the role of the 
South Sudanese churches have been instrumental in facilitating grassroots 
peace dialogues and encouraging inter-ethnic reconciliation in the past, their 
role in peacebuilding in the aftermath of independence could be equally 
crucial (p. 253).                                            
     Haneef (2013) sees South Sudan in a quasi-emergency situation, with 
ongoing conflict in different regions, and raises the issue of South Sudanese 
repatriates whose inability to find livelihood opportunities in the country is 
likely to create considerable tensions. Though, she argues, many South 
Sudanese strongly associate with their identity and want to go back to their 
country, the situation in the ground is not conducive; neither for development 
nor for safe repatriation of refugees (p. 66-67).  
     A 2012 study Conflict Transformation in the Republic of South Sudan 
emphasizes on the need to see peace as a process, specially while a society has 
to retreat from a deep embedded culture of violence (Alex 2012, p.3). The 
author advocates for an adoption of ‘new peace-oriented beliefs, behaviors 
and attitudes’ and recommends reconciliation measures as well as special 
peace education for violent prone youths (ibid).    
     The studies briefly discussed above do offer some significant insights into 
the South Sudanese peace process. They focus and elaborate on different 
factors that are important for peacebuilding; they also identify and discuss the 
role of different stakeholders and make different recommendations for 
peacebuilding mainly on the basis of their empirical findings. However, these 
studies do not provide sufficient insights into policies and discourses they 
carry and perpetuate. They do not touch upon issues such as why certain 
ideas and concepts; for instance state-building, market economy; are 
promoted while other concepts; such as peace by development and welfare, 
are less prioritized. On the other hand, these studies fail to draw sufficient 
examples from historical experiences of foreign involvement and contextualize 
that with the current affairs in South Sudan. As none of the studies reviewed 
above focused on post-secession peace policies, they are not able to provide 
an outlook into the peace policy atmosphere of South Sudan. Likewise, these 
studies position their work on isolated issues; such as the CPA, or refugees, 
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reconciliation or different individual stakeholders; and fail to provide a 
holistic and coherent understanding  of peacebuilding in South Sudan.  
     Though without being overtly ambitious, this thesis looks into policy issues 
in a wider perspective, tries to identify discursive practices; i.e. why some 
concepts are adopted and prioritized while others are not. It also 
contextualizes historical links of foreign involvement and tries to incorporate 
both micro and macro issues in an attempt to construct a holistic 
understanding of peacebuilding.  
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Chapter III 
 
Theoretical Framework :  
Theories Of Peace And Peacebuilding  
 
The aim of this chapter is to critically discuss a few relevant and major 
theoretical paradigms surrounding peacebuilding. First, the Kantian notion of 
perpetual peace is briefly discussed primarily because of its alleged influence 
on the contemporary liberal thought in peacebuilding (Doyle 1983, p. 205-
235). Then the subsequent sections introduce the ideas of democratic peace 
theory, liberal peacebuilding and international engagement and discuss their 
wider implications. A separate section elaborates on Johan Galtung’s notions 
of positive peace and negative peace and gives an insight into structural 
violence, new forms of warfare and intrastate aggression that are apparently 
different from traditional forms of interstate warfare, but cause equally, if not 
more, devastating results. Finally, the last section critically discusses issues of 
transitional justice and national reconciliation in a post-coflict situation.        
 
Peace Research in practice  
Ekkehart Krippendorff argues that due to the emergence of International 
Relations as an academic discipline in the wake of World War I and also 
because of the widely felt need and demand to have 'a new policy of peace 
among nations', Peace Research emerged as an 'effort to understand the 
origins of war and to discover means for preventing the future outbreak of 
another war' (Krippendorff 1970, p.1).  
     Given that the world is grappling with a number of wars and conflicts, 
tragedies, suffering and displacements; the scope of peace as an area of 
academic inquisition is unprecedented, and today, the field of peace research 
or peace studies holds a number of 'peace theories' that aim for, among others, 
a meaningful conflict transformation, cessation of violence, and embodiment 
of peace notions as a cultural practice.  
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go through and analyze each peace 
theory in existence, but the effort here is to give a general overview of a few 
influential peace theories and concepts that are theoretically relevant to the 
focus of this study, i.e. sustainable peacebuilding in a post-conflict scenario.  
 
3.1 The Kantian notion of perpetual peace  
In his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant proposes his ideas for perpetual peace. His 
recommendations basically constitute steps to be taken by states for a peaceful 
coexistence. Structured in two parts, the essay first presents a set of 
preliminary measures to be immediately adopted and then supplements a few 
more definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.  
In his Preliminary Articles, Kant presents the following six points:  
 
1. 'No peace treaty is valid if it was made with mental reservations that 
could lead to a future war.' 
2. 'No independent states, large or small, are to come under the dominion 
of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.' 
3. 'Standing armies are eventually to be abolished.' 
4. 'National debts are not to be incurred as an aid to the conduct of 
foreign policy.' 
5. 'No state is to interfere by force with the constitution or government of 
another state.' 
6. 'No state during a war is to permit acts of hostility that would make 
mutual confidence impossible after the war is over—e.g. the use of 
assassins and poisoners, breach of capitulation, incitement to treason in 
the opposing state.' (Kant 1795, p.1-3.) 
 
In addition, Kant’s three Definitive Articles provide a broader perspective on 
peacebuilding and cessation of hostilities.  
'The civil constitution of every state is to be republican.’  
‘The law of nations is to be founded on a federation of free 
states.’  
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‘The law of world citizenship is to be united to conditions of 
universal hospitality.’ (Kant 1795, p. 3-6.)  
 
Obviously, the philosophical debate concerning peace and justice in the 
international system started long ago before Kant and the quest still continues, 
but still the Kantian perspective is notable for a number of reasons. First and 
foremost, his ideas have significantly influenced modern theories of peace and 
international relations ( See for instance, Doyle 1983, Solomon 2003, Rauber 
2009) and despite their own shortcomings his ideas have, arguably, 'created a 
self-contained, comprehensive system of philosophy which in terms of 
thematic versatility and theoretical foundation has only seldom been truly 
challenged' (Rauber 2009, p. 51). Though Kant was not fond of democracy 
(Ray 1998, p.28), his idea of perpetual peace 'as the ultimate virtue and the 
main purpose of practical philosophy matches the most prominent concern of 
international law' (Rauber 2009, p. 51).  
 
3.2 The Kantian Legacy and the Democratic Peace 
Theory 
Even though Immanuel Kant offers a comprehensive set of thoughts on peace, 
the need to move beyond the Kantian philosophy is obvious as the global 
socio-political realities are significantly different to that of 1795 and with the 
evolutionary development of the Social Sciences, a new set of theories have 
emerged.  
     Let's look at one of the contemporary peace theories which, arguably, has 
its roots in the Kantian philosophy and is often regarded as highly influential 
in the present day global peace discourse: the democratic peace theory. The 
main assumption of the democratic peace theory is that democracies do not 
fight against each other and are more peaceful compared to other political 
systems, for instance, an autocracy (Maoz & Abdolali 1989, Small & Singer 
1976, Oneal & Russett 2001,Tocqueville 1988, Ray 1998, Framceschet 2000, 
p. 279, Gat 2006 p. 597-609). Though less likely to fight against each other, 
there is no evidence that democracies are less likely to fight wars in general 
(Lake 1992, p.24).  
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     Azar Gat, in his 2006 book War in Human Civilization, argues that 
democratic societies seem to be more peaceful than other forms of governance 
primarily because of several related as well as independent factors such as 
wealth and comfort; metropolitan service society, sexual revolution, fewer 
number of males, fewer children per family, women's franchise and the dread 
of nuclear weapons. He believes that wealth and comfort make people willing 
to engage in luxury than opting for war. Similarly, he argues that the decrease 
in military conscription from countryside and availability of sex due to the pill 
and women's increased participation in the labor market also decreases the 
likelihood of war. In addition, Gat implies that factors such as fewer number 
of younger males in population distribution, due to elevated life expectancy of 
course, fewer children in families, women's franchise and their less belligerent 
nature, and the dread of nuclear weapons also help reduce the risk of war. 
(Gat 2006 p. 597-609). However, Gat's analysis doesn't seem to be focusing 
on the fact that non-democracies, too, are equip with a number of elements 
that he mentions in his list.  
     Presenting his ideas on the basis of the microeconomic theory of the state, 
Lake (1992) argues that democracies are less belligerent because the cost of 
running the state is low in democracies as compared to autocracies, and the 
fact ultimately makes the latter expansionist and war prone, while the former 
tend to 'devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater societal 
support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming countercoalitions 
against expansionist autocracies' (p. 24). Similarly, Ray (1998) argues that 
there are some factors that compel democracies to refrain from serious, 
militarized hostilities, while some other factors enable them to solve disputes 
peacefully even when they do occur (p. 43). 
     While looking for empirical evidence to support the notion that 
democracies are less belligerent, Maoz & Abdolahi (1989) analyze almost 
every state in the world in the years from 1816 to 1976, totaling 271,904 
observations, and conclude that even during the lengthy period of 160 years, 
not even a single war was fought between two democratic states. They also 
argue that democracies are less likely to engage in 'lower-level' conflict with 
each other. (Maoz & Abdolahi 1989, p. 21.) Similarly, Melvin Small & J. 
David Singer find similar results with mere two statistically insignificant 
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exceptions (Small & Singer 1976, p. 56-69). Bremer (1992, p. 309) also 
confirms that a lack of 'democratic polity' makes states vulnerable to wars.  
     Though supported by robust arguments and a number of empirical 
evidences, the democratic peace theory equally suffers from harsh criticisms. 
The theory has been criticized mainly on three grounds: the lack of sufficient 
empirical data due to newness of democracy (Wayman 2002, Gowa 1999), 
complications associated with the definition of democracy and war (Spiro 
1994, Ray 1995, p.103) and the difficulty to vividly establish causal 
relationships (Henderson 2002). 
     Some critics of the democratic peace theory argue that since there have 
been few democracies and few inter-state wars, the lack of war between 
democracies can't be very surprising (See for instance Wayman 2002, Gowa 
1999, Small & Singer 1976). In addition, Wayman (2002) argues that the 
phenomenon is not that surprising 'given that many of the democracies that 
have existed have been allies in NATO, driven into each other’s arms by their 
sense of threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War era' and other 
aspects such as 'shared trade and prosperity, membership in common in 
international organizations, and the global drift toward less inter-state war 
nowadays' might have played significant role for an alleged peaceful existence 
of democracies (p.1).  
     The proponents of the democratic peace theory have been accused of 
manipulating the definitions of democracy and war to support their empirical 
data and ultimately the inductive outcome. David Spiro argues that they do so 
by quickly dismissing the anomalous evidence stating that the states in 
question are either not democracies, or not independent, or by discarding the 
conflict in question as war (Spiro 1994, p. 50-86).  
     Though acknowledging that democracies have waged few wars against 
each other, Mansfield and Snyder, however, argue that states in the process of 
'democratization' are more war prone than mature democracies or stable 
autocracies or even countries moving toward autocracy. They claim that 
'transitions toward democracy are significantly more likely to generate 
hostilities than transitions toward autocracy’ (Mansfield & Snyder 2002, p. 
298). This happens so because 'elites in newly democratizing states often use 
nationalist appeals to attract mass support without submitting to full 
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democratic accountability and that the institutional weakness of transitional 
states creates the opportunity for such war-causing strategies to 
succeed'(ibid).  
     Definition of interstate war per se and inclusion and exclusion of certain 
type of conflict has been problematic as well. While many researches have 
chosen to use 1000 battle deaths, as indicated by the Correlates of War 
project, as a standard for defining an interstate war, others see it inadequate 
as it doesn't include civil wars and other various wars that occur for different 
reasons (Ray 1998, p. 31). Some researchers, however, seem to choose their 
own standards for labelling whether conflict in question is a war. For 
instance, Weart (1998) limits his choice to 200 battle deaths, while Russett 
(1993) takes any battle engagement into consideration (p. 50).  
     Though problematic and not enough to make confidant and universal 
generalizations, the democratic peace theory does have significant empirical 
and theoretical backing, and as Solomon (2003) argues, the DPT doctrine 'has 
in recent years provided cause for optimism', despite, 'large measures of 
uncertainty still remain and its significance for the question of competitive war 
preparations is far from clear' (p. 122).  
     The motive here, however, is not to argue for or against the DPT, but to 
discuss the far-reaching implications of it when it is integrated and advocated 
as a standard instrument of foreign policy and a mandatory prerequisite for 
international development cooperation. 
     Though amidst controversies, relative credibility and validity of the DPT 
has certainly strengthened the Western confidence in its political system and 
has encouraged Western governments to include democracy as a topmost 
priority in their explicit foreign policy regimen. For instance, Mansfield & 
Snyder (2002) argue that the policy implication of the DPT in the US foreign 
policy sphere has had been significant.  
 
The centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s was the claim that 
promoting democracy would foster peace. Noting that no two 
democracies have ever fought a war against each other, President Bill 
Clinton argued that support for democratization would be an antidote 
to international war and civil strife. Yet the 1990s turned out to be a 
decade of both democratization and chronic nationalist conflict, both 
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within and between some transitional states. (Mansfield & Snyder 
2002, p. 297.)  
 
This way, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to argue that the confidence in 
democracy as the most peaceful polity and a similar fondness for other liberal 
notions prompted the West to export the mantras of democracy and 
economic liberalism as means of building peace in troubled states and that 
ultimately gave rise to a whole new idea in the field of international 
peacebuilding: the liberal peacebuilding, and the following section discusses 
that very issue.  
 
3.3 Liberal Peacebuilding and International 
Engagement  
Commonly known as the international version of the democratic peace theory, 
the notion of liberal peace is based on the idea that peace can be developed 
and consolidated in a country by the promotion of ‘liberal democracy, liberal 
human rights, the integration of societies into globalization and the centralized 
secular state’ (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p.4).  Chandler (2010) 
argues that, in essence, the ‘liberal peace’ is held to go beyond traditional 
approaches of conflict prevention, or ‘negative peace’; towards the external 
engineering of post-conflict societies through the export of liberal frameworks 
of ‘good governance’, democratic elections, human rights, the rule of law and 
market relations’ (p. 1-2). 
     In their 2009 work New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding Newman, 
Paris & Richmond observe that international peacebuilding in recent years 
comprise of ‘security, development, humanitarian assistance, governance and 
the rule of law’ (p.5).  They argue, in addition, that a majority of 
peacebuilding operations have involved ‘elections or broader democracy-
assistance activities, market economics...and a broader range of practices and 
values, including secular authority, capacity-building, centralized governance 
and institutions of justice’ (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 10-12).  
Sabaratnam (2011) argues that particularly since the terrorist attacks in 2001, 
focus of international conflict management has been systematically and 
  
56 
substantially on ‘governance and statebuilding’ rather than on ‘peace and 
reconciliation’ (p.18).   
     Newman, Paris & Richmond (2009) equate contemporary peacebuilding 
to liberal peacebuilding and argue that the concept is based on the notion that 
liberally constituted societies ‘tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic 
affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are’ (p.10). 
     In essence, the idea of liberal peace, thus, is based on the premises that 
liberal societies tend to be peaceful and prosperous, at least akin to Western 
states, and their replication in conflict-prone or post-conflict countries is 
likely to bring similar results. 
     The liberal peace approach has been criticized on different grounds. 
Chandler (2010) argues that the main cause behind the criticism of the liberal 
peace approach is based on the assumption that the focus of the liberal peace 
approach is to ‘reproduce and impose Western models’ along with ‘winner-
takes-all elections; and neo-liberal free market economic programmes’ (p.1). 
He, however, broadly categorizes such critics into two lines as power-based 
and idea based critiques. The power-based critiques question the authenticity 
of Western rhetoric of freedom and democracy and see liberal peace policies 
as power-based and political, thereby, merely representing Western self-
interest. Whereas, the idea-based critics, while supporting the values of 
democracy and the free market, argue ‘against the liberal peace approach on 
the basis that it is unsuitable in the context of post-conflict states and 
situations of state failure’ (Chandler 2010, p.5-6). According to them, 
‘attempts to universalise Western models in non-liberal contexts, will merely 
reproduce, and maybe even exacerbate, the problems of conflict and 
instability’ (ibid p.8). 
     Similarly, the liberal peace approach has been criticized for its inability to 
accommodate and ensure local people’s participation in peacebuilding. For 
instance, Roberts (2012) argues that the liberal peace approach suffers elite 
hijacking and is affected by its own illiberal character and indifference to local 
people in determining their own fate (p. 366-368). He further elaborates:  
 
The problem lies here: Local people do not direct the nature of the 
peace built in peacebuilding; they are excluded from its design, a 
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process commandeered instead by national elites and international 
policy makers (Roberts 2012, p. 368).  
 
Oliver Richmond, another fervent critic of the liberal peace approach, accuses 
liberal peacebuilding of focusing too much on international or regional peace 
instead of an everyday form of peace. He further criticizes the approach for its 
‘lack of social welfare frameworks’, ‘failure to mediate cultural differences’ 
and the ‘tendency towards assimilation rather than local cultural engagement’ 
(Richmond 2009, p. 566). Newman, Paris & Richmond in their 2009 work 
outline that liberal peacebuilding and some ‘international interventions are 
counterproductive because they in effect ‘‘freeze’’ conflicts in place rather than 
allowing these conflicts to burn themselves out’ (p.16).  
     Some theoretical arguments have certainly emerged in defense of liberal 
peace, with the core argument being that there are no viable, better 
alternatives to liberal peace; and conflict-prone and post-conflict countries 
would be worse off in absence of liberal peace approach (see for instance 
Paris 2010). Some have argued for a reformed and rectified form of liberal 
peace that would accommodate local participation and welfare activities. 
     Paris (2010) argues that the liberal peace approach has been ‘more difficult 
and unpredictable than initially expected’ but, for him, critiques that label 
liberal peacebuilding as ‘fundamentally destructive and illegitimate’ are either 
‘exaggerated or misdirected’ (p.337). Paris calls for a reform to existing 
approaches within what he calls a ‘broadly liberal framework’ and defends 
international peacebuilding operations:  
 
In spite of their many flaws, they have done more good than 
harm...and the failure of the existing peacebuilding project would be 
tantamount to abandoning tens of millions of people to lawlessness, 
predation, disease and fear (Paris 2010, p. 338).  
 
Roberts (2012), on the other hand, criticizes liberal peacebuilding for its 
underestimation of local capacity and argues for a new form of ‘popular 
peace’, which, in essence, is ‘designed by local societies and furnished 
externally by international society,’ (p. 368). He sees this type of popular 
peace to be more emancipatory and more likely to be accepted and cherished 
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locally (p.372).  
     Richmond (2009), however, emphasizes on detailed ontological 
understanding of local cultural traditions and links poverty and deprivation 
with violence and aggression. He stresses on creating social welfare oriented 
peacebuilding institutions and offers a more comprehensive set of 
recommendations putting welfare initiatives in center. His ‘post liberal peace’ 
also encompasses a sheer focus on everyday care, empathy, human security 
and other measures that lead to emancipation of ordinary people (P. 578-
580).  
     It is obvious that ideas and discourses of international peacebuilding have 
been gradually changing over the years, but rather dismally the center of 
discussion still revolves around the idea that ‘ideally peaceful’ global North is 
an agent of bringing peace to rather tumultuous global South. However, as 
Sabaratnam (2011), envisages, ‘the next iteration of the important debate will 
also have to speak to an increasingly confident global South, which shows 
scepticism towards traditional forms of assistance and the presumed better 
capabilities of the North’ (p.21).    
 
3.4 Negative Peace, Positive Peace & New Wars  
Norwegian peace scholar Johan Galtung offers a wide range of ideas on peace, 
conflict, structural violence and reconciliation. Galtung divides peace into 
either as negative or positive and discuss differnt factors that contribute to 
sustainable/positive peacebuilding. Galtung’s ideas on peace remain amongst 
most cited and discussed ones in the contemporary peacebuilding discourses.    
     In his 1996 book Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, 
Development and Civilization, Johan Galtung offers a holistic approach to the 
overall idea of peace and peacebuilding. He argues that peace can be both 
positive and negative and the cure could be both preventive and curative. For 
him, negative peace 'is the absence of violence, absence of war' or processes of 
violence reduction, whereas, positive peace 'is the integration of human 
society' or 'processes of life enhancement (Galtung 1964 p. 2, Galtung 1996, p. 
30). Thus, positive peace is emancipatory in nature (Grewal 2003, p. 6). 
     Galtung defines peace as the 'absence/reduction of violence of all kinds', 
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but also as 'nonviolent and creative conflict transformation'(Galtung 1996, p. 
9). For him, peace work is 'work to reduce violence by peaceful means' (ibid).   
      Galtung equates indirect violence with structural violence and believes 
that 'indirect violence comes from the social structure itself '(Galtung 1996, p. 
2). That notion is particularly important at a time when forms and targets of 
violence seem to have changed significantly. In line with that, Simon Cottle 
argues that despite ‘major intensive wars fought for territorial conquest and 
control have declined in the world, civil wars and other forms of intrastate 
conflicts often involving extreme violence, including genocide and the 
deliberate targeting of civilian population continue’ (Cottle 2008, p. 114-115). 
He adds that such conflicts often cause ‘large number of internally displaced 
people and an exodus of refugees to neighboring territories’ (ibid).   
     Wars and conflicts end most often with political negotiations, but ending a 
conflict doesn't mean that wounds caused by war heal automatically. As 
Galtung elaborates, 'the most naïve view one can possibly have of a conflict is 
to believe that a conflict is solved once the elites from the parties of the 
conflict formation have accepted the solution, as indicated by their signature 
on some document outlining the new formation' (Galtung 1996, p. 89). He 
broadens the scope of peacebuilding and argues that peacebuilding is about 
overcoming 'the contradiction at the root of the conflict formation...the goal is 
an acceptable formula, defining a new formation; new structures, new 
institutions' (Galtung 1996, p. 112). 
     In addition, Galtung presents three factors that uphold war or violent 
conflicts: patriarchy, i.e. rule by the male gender; the state system, with its 
monopoly on violence and the super-state; and superpower system, with the 
ultimate monopoly of the hegemons, are responsible for upholding war 
(Galtung 1996, p. 5). His focus is on structures; gender and hegemonic issues, 
but there might be other issues such as identity and natural resources that 
perpetuate a violent conflict. Galtung advocates for a South-South 
cooperation for peacebuilding and development in the South, which could, in 
fact, be useful in South Sudan's case as the country can significantly benefit 
from other countries' experiences with conflict transformation and 
peacebuilding.  
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     A few scholars have come up with explanations for new types of war that 
are being seen especially after the Cold War. Mary Kaldor, a key thinker of 
New Wars theory, argues that whereas old war could be understood as a ‘war 
between states fought by armed forces in uniform’, there is another type of 
warfare which has little to do with the use of new technology, but with the 
social relations of warfare (Kaldor 2005). She talks about a new type of 
warfare that is fought for claiming identity instead of territory, often with 
ruthless guerrilla and terror tactics, causing enormous civilian suffering. She 
argues that New War is associated with ‘globalization and the disintegration 
of states’ (Kaldor 2005, p. 2).     
 
They are wars where taxation is falling and war finance consists of 
loot and pillage, illegal trading and other war-generated revenue. 
They are wars where the distinctions between combatant and non-
combatant, legitimate violence and criminality are all breaking down. 
These are wars which exacerbate the disintegration of the state – 
declines in GDP, loss of tax revenue, loss of legitimacy. Above all, they 
construct new sectarian identities (religious, ethnic or tribal) that 
undermine the sense of a shared political community. (Kaldor 2005, 
p.3.)   
 
Another proponent of New Wars theory Mark Duffield argues that new wars 
can be fought in territorial network through and around states and instead of 
traditional armies such wars are mostly fought by ‘trans-border resource 
networks of state incumbents, social groups, diasporas, strongmen, and so on’ 
(Duffield 2001, p.14). 
     On the basis of above mentioned arguments it can be said that New Wars 
are the wars fought by a network of state or non-state actors, mostly using 
guerrilla techniques to cause more damage, targeting mainly civilians and 
violating conventions of wars and international human rights legislation; 
based on identity, hate, separation and so forth.  
 
3.5 Transitional Justice & Reconciliation for 
Peacebuilding   
First coined in 1995, the term transitional justice seems to be sort of a 
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buzzword in many post conflict scenarios.  According to the International 
Center for Transitional Justice  (ICTJ), a New York based organization 
monitoring transitional justice issues globally; transitional justice refers to the 
‘set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by 
different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights 
abuses’ (ICTJ 2014). These measures include ‘criminal prosecutions, truth 
commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms’ 
(ibid). 
     Anderlini, Conway & Kays (2007) argue that ‘in the aftermath of conflict 
or authoritarian rule, people who have been victimised often demand justice 
and the notion that there cannot be peace without justice emerges forcefully in 
many communities’ (p.1). Transitional justice mechanisms seem to be justified 
on the grounds that ‘in the aftermath of massive human rights abuses, victims 
have well established rights to see the perpetrators punished, to know the 
truth, and to receive reparations’ (ICTJ 2014). And such mechanisms are 
important because ‘systemic human rights violations affect not just the direct 
victims, but society as a whole...and states have duties to guarantee that the 
violations will not recur, and therefore, a special duty to reform institutions 
that were either involved in or incapable of preventing the abuses’ (ibid).  
     Reconciliation, one of the components of transitional justice, varies in 
meaning. According to Anderlini, Conway & Kays (2007), reconciliation can 
simply mean ‘coexistence, dialogue, forgiveness and healing’ and is not an 
‘attempt to restore things to how they were before the conflict, but rather 
about constructing relationships in a way that allows everyone to move 
forward together’ (p.2). They further argue that ‘reconciliation is often seen to 
be crucial if peace processes are to succeed, as it establishes relations among 
parties after a conflict and decreases the risk of further violence’ (p. 3).   
     On reconciliation and transitional justice, Johan Galtung emphasizes on 
the roles of the actors.  
The move from past to future: This move is indispensable, since the 
past evokes all the memories of what went wrong, of direct and 
structural violence of all types. The actors are likely to be experts here, 
The past offers an empirical basis for guilt-distribution, mutually 
among the actors and from above. (Galtung 1996, p. 109.)  
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There have been a few critics of the transitional justice approach as well. 
Chandra Lekha Sriram, for instance, argues that ‘transitional justice processes 
and mechanisms may, like liberal peacebuilding, destabilize post-conflict and 
post-atrocity countries, and may also be externally imposed and 
inappropriate for the political and legal cultures in which they are set up’ 
(2007, p. 579). Vieille (2012) sees the transitional justice approach defined by 
a ‘Western, legalistic approach to justice’ and questions the motive behind 
scholars’ predilection for certain types of institutions that are based on 
neoliberal democratic framework (p.58). 
     Criticisms towards transitional justice processes, however, do not seem to 
be targeted at the concept of transitional justice per se, but seem to aim at 
reforming its inadequacies and saving it from possible risks. 
     Based on the theoretical standpoints discussed above, it can be argued that 
the field of peacebuilding has experienced a paradigm shift in the course of 
time and practice. Theories that focus on interstate warfare seem to be rapidly 
eclipsed by new theories that focus on intra-state warfare, civil wars, 
international engagement, peacekeeping and the so-called war on terrorism. 
On the other hand, more often than before, issues of human rights violations, 
war crimes, transitional justice and reparations seem to be emphasized both in 
peacebuilding literature and practice.     
     Rather skeptical to the ideas of liberal peacebuilding and international 
engagement due to their overtly invasive nature, this study borrows from and 
uses ideas expressed in theories that focus on qualitative and grassroots 
aspects of peacebuilding, such as Galtung’s negative and positive peace, and 
more recent ideas expressed on transitional justice and popular peace.     
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Chapter IV 
 
Research Methodology    
 
This chapter discusses the methodological tools adopted in the study and 
outlines the rationale behind their choice. The chapter starts with a section on 
policy documents analysis and continues to the concept of discourse in socio-
political domain. Different ways of carrying out Critical Discourse Analysis 
and the concepts of genre and intertextuality are discussed before unfolding 
Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional model of CDA in detail. Criticisms 
surrounding Critical Discourse Analysis and its relevance for analysing policy 
documents have been discussed in the final two sections of this chapter.      
 
4.1 Analysis of Policy Documents  
There are many methodological tools and approaches for the study and 
analysis of policy documents and political texts, but not all of them go beyond 
analyzing literal manifestations produced in texts. The aim of this study, 
however, is to go beyond literal textual explanations and to see the implicit 
meanings and subtle messages hidden underneath the words and statements, 
to identify discourses and ideologies sustained and consolidated through 
policy texts. The need to do so obviously demands a method that can 
sufficiently address these issues.  
     When it comes to analyzing policy documents, policy analysis as an 
analytical tool seems to be many researchers’ choice. In general, policy 
analysis seeks to explain political decisions and their consequences and it can 
be regarded as one of the 'means to the end of improving the bases on which 
policies are made at all levels of government' (Lynn 1998, p.417). Similarly, 
Yanow (2000) argues that policy analysis basically intends to 'inform some 
audience-traditionally, the policymaker- about an anticipated policy: what 
its impact will be on a targeted population, whether it is likely to achieve the 
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desired outcome, whether it is the right policy to address a specific 
problem'(p.8). However, as the traditional approach to policy analysis focuses 
more on 'costs, benefits, and choice points', a more humane approach with 
focus on 'values, beliefs, and feelings as a set of meanings' has been advocated 
(ibid p.9) as interpretative policy analysis, with apparent emphasis on 
qualitative outcomes. With its emphasis on qualitative outcomes, 
interpretative policy analysis does seem to have different focus than that of 
ordinary policy analysis, but identifying and analyzing discourses in policy 
documents is not its primary focus.  
     Policy analysis has been criticized for its overemphasis on 'economic 
assumptions and instrumental rationality' and for neglecting 'distributive ends, 
procedural and historical principles, and the values' (Tribe 1972, p.105). More 
recent criticisms (see for instance Lindblom 1990, Schön & Rein 1994) have 
recommended for a drastic revamp of the practice, and have called for a 
cooperative inquiry or 'probing' by scholars and policymakers, but not just 
'solving the decision maker's problem for him' (Lindblom 1990, p.271).  
     Policy analysis or even interpretative policy analysis thus, do not offer 
sufficient methodological instruments to accomplish the mission of this study, 
as they seem more useful on policy-study-recommendation areas and do not 
necessarily tackle the beliefs, convictions, ideologies and discourses that are 
perpetuated or consolidated through texts, often in indirect, implicit and 
ambiguous ways. This necessitates the search and adoption of another 
methodological tool that can sufficiently relate to and address the research 
question.  
 
4.2 Understanding Discourse in Socio-Political 
Domain  
Discourse, in literal sense, can be understood as a written or spoken 
communication, text, or debate, but its use in the socio-political domain is 
significantly broader; and can be seen as a system of power and knowledge. 
The word discourse emanates from the Latin word discurrere which means 'to 
run apart' and thus Diskursus meaning 'to run to and fro' (Encarta 1999, 
p.538).  
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     Michel Foucault, in his popular book Archeology of Knowledge: 
Discourse on Language, extensively discusses the nature of discourse, 
knowledge and how they relate to power relations (Foucault 1972). Foucault 
contents that “whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or 
thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions 
and functionings, transformations), we will say...that we are dealing with a 
discursive formation' (Foucault 1972, p.38). Foucault's focus has been also on 
inclusion and exclusion in discourse practices, i.e. who gets to participate and 
who is excluded. Foucault tries to demonstrate the irrationality of discourses, 
calling them 'risky, discontinuous and overlapping' and labeling discourses as 
a form of violence (Foucault 1971, 55 cited in Stahl 2004). 
     Power relations as well as discipline and rationality seem to be central 
interests of Foucauldian notion of discourse. Instead of literal meanings and 
interpretations, factors that shape communication, such as social interaction 
and processes, are crucial (Foucault 1972). Providing examples of changes in 
medical and legal discourses, Foucault shows how transformation in 
discourses produce real life reverberations, such as on medical institutions and 
court system and criminal punishment methods (Whisnant 2012, p.5).  
     Having borrowed from Foucauldian approach to discourse, Whisnant 
(2012) elaborates on four ways of discourse operation. First, by shaping 
people's perception of the world, discourse creates a world in itself, which is 
largely a social construction that emanates from a 'complex interaction 
between experience, upbringing and education' (p. 5). Second, discourse also 
operates by generating certain type of knowledge and 'truth', ultimately, in 
some contexts, exhibiting the power to convince people to accept certain 
statements as truth. Third, discourse not only imparts the 'intended meaning 
of the language', but also 'says something about the people who speak it.' For 
instance, Whisnant offers an example of doctor-patient relationship where the 
medical discourse give the doctor an authority to speak and places on higher 
position of authority. Fourth, discourses have intimate links with 'socially 
embedded networks of power'. (Whisnant 2012, p. 5-7.)  
Though a robust and revolutionary approach to look at power relations, 
Foucault's approach to discourse has been criticized mainly on two grounds. 
First, the notion of power he uses is extensively wide (see Habermas 1994a), 
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and, second, his blatant criticism and rejection of all discourses, without 
offering a possibility of distinguishing between less desirable and more 
desirable discourses has suffered harsh criticism as well (Habermas 1994b, p. 
88). 
     The following section deals with a few more concepts of discourse that 
are, theoretically or methodologically, relevant to this study. While doing so, 
the attempt is to move from mere 'discourse' to discourse analysis, and 
ultimately to critical discourse analysis (CDA), the methodological tool 
adopted for this study.  
 
4.3 Different Approaches to Discourse Analysis  
Discourse analysis can be understood as a way of identifying and interpreting 
discourses. In that sense, discourse analysis moves beyond the literal meaning 
and what's explicitly expressed in the text. Fairclough argues that discourse is 
'use of language seen as a form of social practice', whereas, discourse analysis 
is 'analysis of how texts work within sociocultural practice' (Fairclough 1995, 
p. 17). However, he further suggests that a text is not necessarily written or 
linguistic, but could be spoken or even any cultural artefact — a picture, a 
building, a piece of music' (ibid p.14).  
     Emphasizing the need for a distinction between explicit and implicit 
features in a text, Fairclough argues for a multifunctional view of text which 
is relevant to carry out 'sociocultural analysis' and also 'ideological analysis' of 
text. For Fairclough, 'texts are social spaces in which two fundamental social 
processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, 
and social interaction' and their analysis requires a multifunctional analytical 
approach (Fairclough1995, p. 15-16). 
     Similarly, Blommaert (2005) argues that the focus of discourse analysis is 
on 'how language is an ingredient of power processes resulting in, and 
sustained by, forms of inequality, and how discourse can be or become a 
justifiable object of analysis, crucial to an understanding of wider aspects of 
power relations' (p.2). He treats discourse as a 'general mode of semiosis', 
calling it 'meaningful symbolic behavior' and defining discourse as 'language-
in-action' (ibid). Aligning himself to the Foucauldian understanding of power, 
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Blommaert argues that discourse 'comprises all forms of meaningful semiotic 
human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns 
and developments of use...What is traditionally understood by language is but 
one manifestation of it' ( Blommaert 2005, p.3). Stressing on the importance 
of the relationship between text and context and the social nature of 
discourse, he contends that discourses do matter to people as they are used in 
everyday life, in different forms and, can be associated with social differences, 
conflict and struggle and different types of social-structural effects (ibid p.4).  
     There are different approaches to discourse analysis. For instance, Eggins 
& Slade (1997) try to locate different approaches to discourse analysis and 
categorize them in relation to respective epistemological approaches that range 
from ethnomethodological conversation analysis to social-semiotic critical 
discourse analysis and critical linguistics (p.24)  
     Pennycook (1994), on the other hand, argues that discourse analysis could 
be either descriptive or critical in nature. While descriptive discourse analysis 
emphasizes language as a system and focuses on contextual factors that 
influence language in use; critical discourse analysis looks at social and 
cultural relationships as the origin of meanings which can be realized in 
language use (Pennycook 1994). While descriptive discourse analysis is 
positivist/modernist, critical discourse analysis is constructionist/ 
poststructuralist (MacDonald 2013, p.7).  
 
4.4 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has its roots in Hallidayan linguistics, a 
theory which examines language in relation to social interactions, and is 
heavily influenced by European scholarship tradition. CDA was founded on 
the idea that approaches to social critique could significantly benefit from 
linguistic analysis. (Blommaert 2005, p. 22.) British Cultural Studies had 
another significant influence on CDA. For instance, The Birmingham Centre 
for Contemporary Culture Studies tried to 'systematically address social, 
cultural, and political problems related to transformations in late capitalist 
society in Britain' (Blommaert 2005, p. 23) and that had a major influence on 
the development of CDA (Slembrouck, 2001). However, the publication of 
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Language and Power by Norman Fairclough in 1989 brought about a new era 
of CDA. In the book, Fairclough presented 'an explicitly politicised analysis of 
‘powerful’discourses in Britain and offered the synthesis of linguistic method, 
objects of analysis, and political commitment' which have now become the 
trademark of CDA (Blommaert 2005, p.23).  
     There are many methods for carrying out Critical Discourse Analysis (see 
for instance Wodak & Meyer 2009, Lillis & McKinney 2003). This study, 
however, follows Norman Fairclough's framework (1992; 1995; Chouliaraki 
& Fairclough, 1999) for Critical Discourse Analysis which is based on the idea 
that texts cannot be detached and analyzed in isolation from the wider social 
context. Fairclough offers a three-layer analytical framework that 
encompasses textual, intertextual and contextual paradigms. Before moving 
on to Fairclough's specific model, let's examine some basic notions of Critical 
Discourse Analysis as a methodological/analytical tool. 
     According to Van Dijk 'Critical Discourse Analysis is a type of discourse 
analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and 
talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical 
discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose 
and ultimately to resist social inequality.' (Dijk 1998, p.1.) So the primary 
focus of CDA is to look at both overt and covert discourses underlying in 
text. 'To put it simply, CDA aims at making transparent the connections 
between discourse practices, social practices, and social structures, 
connections that might be opaque to the layperson'(Sheyholislami 2013). 
     Many theorists in CDA have come up with their own version of principles, 
but the most cited work has been that of Fairclough & Wodak (1997: 271-
280) who summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows: 
 
1. CDA addresses social problems  
2. Power relations are discursive  
3. Discourse Constitutes Society and Culture  
4. Discourse does ideological work  
5. Discourse is historical  
6. The link between text and society is mediated  
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7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory  
8. Discourse is a form of social action. 
 
Though early studies in CDA primarily used 'language' as the 'basis for studies 
of power,' that nowadays has often been 'replaced by discourse as the unit of 
actual language use in which power is enacted' (Dijk. 1998, p.9). Dijk further 
argues, 'if dominant groups, and especially their elites largely control public 
discourse and its structures, they thus also have more control over the minds 
of the public at large', though, 'such control has its limits' and 'the complexity 
of comprehension and the formation and change of beliefs, are such that one 
cannot always predict which features of a specific text or talk will have which 
effects on the minds of specific recipients' (Dijk, 1998, p. 9).  
     Power and its institutional reproduction remain central to CDA. Thus its 
aim is to analyze ‘opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of 
dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’ 
(Wodak 1995 p.204). In addition:  
 
[CDA] studies real, and often extended, instances of social interaction 
which take (partially) linguistic form. The critical approach is 
distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and 
society, and (b) the relationship between analysis and the practices 
analysed. (Wodak 1997, p.173.) 
 
It has been argued that CDA sees discourse as 'socially constitutive' and 
'socially conditioned' and 'advocates (active) intervention in the social 
practices it critically investigates' (Blommaert 2005, p. 25). Some scholars like 
M. Toolan (1997) even prescribe CDA to explicitly advocate for change, 
empowerment and practice orientedness. Some scholars argue that CDA 
acknowledges the dialectical relationship between language and society,i.e. 
Language is influenced by society and society is influenced by language (Wang 
2006). CDA 'conceives discourse as a social phenomenon and seeks, 
consequently, to improve the social-theoretical foundations for practising 
discourse analysis as well as for situating discourse in society' (Blommaert 
2005, p. 27).  
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     There are two major streams of critical discourse analysis: the detailed 
textual analysis approach to CDA based on Norman Fairclough's work and 
the study of social variables as represented by van Dijk and Gee.  
 
4.5 Norman Fairclough's CDA  
Norman Fairclough, one of the prominent scholars of CDA, especially within 
the British context, has contributed enormously by linking different 
dimensions of power and social context to CDA, and thereby developing it as 
a method of analysis. His focus has been on social construction and social 
formation of language which constitutes ‘social identities, social relations and 
systems of knowledge and belief’. (Dijk, 1998, p. 18.)  
     Fairclough's three-dimensional model for CDA (Fairclough 1995), which 
this study uses as a tool for analysis, constitutes:  
1. The examination of the linguistic features of texts (the level of the text) 
2. The exploration of processes related to the production and 
consumption of texts (the discursive practice); and  
3. The consideration of the wider social and cultural context to which the 
text as a "communicative event" belongs (the sociocultural practices). 
 
Fairclough uses three components- description, interpretation and 
explanation- for his analysis. Textual analysis, primarily, is carried out by 
description of linguistic characteristics, the link between the productive and 
interpretative procedures of discursive practice and the text is interpreted, 
finally explaining the nexus between social practice and discursive practice 
(Fairclough 1995). Discursive practice can be understood as discourse which 
is 'produced, circulated, distributed, and consumed in society' (Blommaert 
2005, p. 29). Thus Fairclough's attempt is towards establishing a systematic 
method for studying the nexus between text and its social context, the 
dimensions on which the method relies on are shown in the figure below.  
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 (Source: Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter 2000, p. 152, based on 
Fairclough's 1992a, p. 73)  
 
This framework based on Fairclough’s 1992 work includes multi-layered 
analysis that includes text, process of interpretation and discourse practice, 
but also sociocultural practice. Interestingly, text is at the core of the analysis, 
which figuratively means that linguistic features offer the bases or evidence for 
claims in discourse analytical work.  
 
4.6 Genre and Intertextuality 
In Critical Discourse Analysis the 'type of language used in the performance of 
a particular social practice' has been defined as genre (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 57). Such genres could be, for instance, the legal genre, 
the journalism genre, the fictional genre and so on. However, when it comes 
to an order of discourse, it has been defined as 'a socially structured 
articulation of discursive practices (including both genres and discourses)' 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 114). According to Hyland:  
 
Genres are abstract, socially recognized ways of using 
language. Genre analysis is based on two central assumptions: 
that the features of a similar group of texts depend on the 
social context of their creation and use, and that those features 
can be described in a way that relates a text to others like it 
Figure 4.1: Dimensions of discourse and critical discourse analysis 
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and to the choices and constraints acting on text producers. 
(Hyland, 2002, p. 114.)  
 
Kress (1989) argues that analysing genre is a way of understating the link 
between text and social context as genre analysis 'based on the idea of the 
communicative purpose of social context determines the source of the text' 
and an insight into genres also means an insight into the culture (p.17). 
     The concept of intertextuality is derived from the Bakhtinian notion that 
texts have histories and they are an echo of past texts (Bakhtin 1986, Kristeva 
1986). Adoption of intertextual view thereby enables one to go beyond purely 
linguistic analysis.  
 
While the linguistic analysis of texts shows how (texts) are positioned 
in the language or languages they draw upon, the intertextual analysis 
of texts shows how they are positioned in relation to what I shall call 
'orders of discourse' (Chouliaraki 1998, p.10).  
 
According to Fairclough's notion of intertextuality and intertextual analysis, 
while there is linguistic analysis of text, the same can be done with discourse 
practice as well, and that is what he has termed as intertextuality. Fairclough 
argues that 'intertextual analysis focuses on the borderline between text and 
discourse practice in the analytical framework. Intertextual analysis is looking 
at text from the perspective of discourse practice, looking at the traces of the 
discourse practice in the text'. (Fairclough 1995, p.16.) In addition, Fairclough 
contends that while linguistic analysis is descriptive in nature, intertextual 
analysis tends to be more interpretative (Fairclough 1995, p.16).  
 
4.7 Criticisms of Critical Discourse Analysis  
Critical Discourse Analysis has been critized on many grounds. Such criticisms 
come from scholars that advocate for other forms of textual analysis (Wang 
2006). Criticisms to CDA are mainly focused on theoretical and 
methodological defects, but it has received some general critics too. 
Widdowson (1995), for instance, claims that CDA fails to make a clear 
distinction between text and discourse and is more of ideological 
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interpretation of text rather than an analysis. He further argues that CDA 
compels the reader to see an ideology in text, even if there is no ideology at all 
(p.158). Similarly, Schegloff (1997) claims that, in the name of analysis, CDA 
analysts are in fact projecting their own 'political biases and prejudices onto 
their data and analyse them accordingly' (cited in Blommaert 2005, p. 32). 
Slembrouck (2001) pose a serious criticism questioning the 'explanatory' level 
in CDA, which he believes, excludes the participant out of the analysis and, 
thereby, impose a view from above, instead of giving voice to the below.    
     Blommaert (2005), while commending CDA as a method that offers 
considerable potential, discusses a few shortcomings of CDA as its limitations. 
In his opinion, the linguistic bias i.e. Putting very high price on linguistic-
textual analysis is one of the problems that CDA severely suffers from. He 
also argues that CDA is silent on as to how linguistically investigate discourses 
that are absent and expresses his concern for the fact that CDA stops the 
process of analysis as soon as the discourse has been found. He also calls the 
practice First World focused and closure to particular time-frame only. 
(p.33-36.)  
     Despite these criticisms, many academic practitioners adopt and vigorously 
support CDA as it has the ability to revealing implicit values, beliefs, extricate 
power relations, injustices that are perpetuate through text, but not necessarily 
explicit in nature.  
4.8 Critical Discourse Analysis and Policy 
Documents  
Discourse analysis or critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a methodological 
and analytical tool has been used by many researchers to identify different 
discourses in policy documents. A few examples of such studies have been 
provided herein.  
     Pinto (2011) applies Fairclough's three-layered approach of CDA to study, 
what she mentions, the single most important policy instrument in the 
disability arena in Portugal: the First National Action Plan for the Integration 
of People with Disabilities and Impairment (PAIPDI), and, among others, 
finds the adoption of the rights discourse in disability as a new phenomenon 
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and highlights the perpetuation of other discourses, such as medical discourse, 
that keep power relations sustained and consolidated.  
     Isola (2012) carries out a critical discourse analysis of the US foreign 
policy during two presidential terms, that of George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama, by analyzing state-of-the-union speeches by the two presidents and 
finds that GW Bush's policy dominated by the danger and unilateral 
discourses, whereas, that of Obama by responsible leadership and 
multilateralism. However, she finds, both presidents used American 
exceptionalism as a common discourse to frame their foreign policy.  
     Repo (2006) applies discourse analysis and Foucauldian approach to 
discourse as her methodological orientation to study gendering and 
militarization of war on terrorism. With a special emphasis on representation 
of masculinities and femininities, she points out to discourses, such as 
demonizing discourse and women's rights discourse, that shape gendering and 
militarization of war on terror.  
     Having used the CDA for educational policy research, Dunn (2006) argues 
that neoliberal discourses in educational policy necessitate new tools for an 
effective critique and, in his opinion, CDA has just done that. Similarly, 
Hewitt (2009) praises discourse analysis for public policy research or study of 
policy documents as the method helps understand complex policy activity 
which are not always based on rational or political framework. 
     To conclude, as presented in the different sections of this chapter, different 
methods and tools can be used to analyse policy documents. While some 
methods of policy analysis focus on textual and interpretative analysis, 
discourse analysis looks for discourses that are overtly or covertly embedded 
in policy texts. This is obviously helpful when one intends to understand 
different discourses hidden in socio-political domains. Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) takes the practice of discourse analysis to a new level as it 
offers a holistice framework for analysising discourses through textual, 
intertextual and contextual analyses. This way certain domains of discourses 
can be linked to other domains, power ralations can be better understood and 
the utility of discourses can be analysed in terms of contexts they are 
introduced.  
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Chapter V  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis of the 
Policy Documents 
 
The aim of this chapter is to carry out a Critical Discourse Analysis of the 
selected four Policy documents by using Norman Fairclouh’s three 
dimensional approach to CDA. First, the chapter begins with a textual 
analysis of the policy texts with the aim of exploring the ‘texture’ of the policy 
documents. In the second section, the idea of text as discursive pratice is 
further explored and different discourses are identified and discussed. Finally, 
the third section presents a historical and contextual positioning of the 
discourses and proposes factors that possibly caused their emergence.  
 
The selected policy documents namely are:   
 
1- The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A 
2005 (the CPA) 
2- South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 (the SSDP)    
3- South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013-2015 (the PRS) 
4- Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation 2013 (the CSDHPR)  
 
Hereafter, the documents are either referred jointly as the Policy 
documents/papers or separately as the CPA, the SSDP, the PRS and the 
CSDHPR. The chapter is divided into three sub-chapters for the purpose of 
three different analyses of the CDA: Textual analysis, Intertextual analysis 
and Contextual analysis.     
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5.1 Textual Analysis- Exploring the 'Texture' of the 
Policy Documents 
     As Fairclough's framework entails the analysis of the 'texture of the text' as 
its first dimension, it is certainly prudent to start from the lexical as well as the 
structural analysis of the text used in the policy documents. These documents 
apparently were created and promulgated at a historical juncture when a 
decades long, protracted, tedious and bloody war had just come to an end. 
These documents appeared at a time when a new country and a new identity 
was being born and was being internationally recognized and a promising 
future seemed to be at sight for the people of South Sudan. These factors 
certainly have influenced the language used in the policy documents. Starting 
from the CPA up-to the CSDHPR, the longing for peace, prosperity and 
development is profound, often in the form of different metaphors. Therefore, 
obviously these policy documents were created to serve their specific, rather 
utilitarian purposes, but they serve also as metaphors of hope, peace and 
better future for South Sudan.                                            
     Let’s talk about use of metaphors in the documents. Text as a 
metaphorical element is of particular interest while carrying out a CDA. From 
the CDA perspective, metaphors do give significant insights into particular 
aspects of reality. As Fairclough (1992) argues: ‘When we signify things 
through one metaphor rather than another, we are constructing our reality in 
one way rather than another. Metaphors structure the way we think and the 
way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief, in a pervasive and 
fundamental way’ (p. 195). 
     Relatively, the CPA is written in a technical language, with a lot of jargons 
and sophisticated terminologies, and is not very elaborate on various 
occasions. However, it does not refrain from imparting hope for peace 
deprived people of the Sudan and Southern Sudan.   
 
Mindful of the urgent need to bring peace and security to the people 
of the Sudan who have endured this conflict for far too long…Now 
herein the parties jointly acknowledge that the CPA offers not only 
hope but also a concrete model for solving problems and other 
conflicts in the country (the CPA 2005, p. xi- xii).  
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Though the CPA was signed between only two warring parties, the GoS and 
SPLM/A, and thereby its scope was very narrow and limited, but still  its aims 
are ambitious. It didn’t end other conflicts in Sudan, such as one in Darfur or 
conflicts within Southern Sudan, but the document goes on claiming that it 
has ‘concrete model’ for solving conflicts in Sudan. This is apparently an 
outcome of the excitement of ending a four decade long conflict that caused 
tremendous suffering and bloodshed.   
     The SSDP, on the other hand, was created in the wake of independence 
and the document is constructed as a metaphor of a 'new beginning' for South 
Sudan. When going through the text, that sense of determination, at least in 
the language, is identifiable everywhere. So, the SSDP was crafted as a 
metaphor of 'hope' for South Sudanese; rather a symbol of 'progress' or an 
emblem of 'enthusiasm', a sign of breaking away from the past and moving 
forward to a new, better future. 
     Hopes for a better and stable future are abundant in the text. The SSDP 
also presents a retrospective analysis and memories of the past; having 
frequently referred to the long and tedious process of liberation, the decades 
long conflict, rampant poverty and suffering of the South Sudanese. As stated, 
the overall objective of the SSDP is:  
 
To ensure that by 2014 South Sudan is a united and peaceful 
new nation, building strong foundations for good governance, 
economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all (the 
SSDP 2011, p. xiv).  
 
The language used in the above paragraph and also in the entire text of the 
SSDP is intented to deliver a message of political commitment to a peaceful 
and prosperous South Sudan, though, given the challenges the country faced, 
it was quite unrealistic to have such high expectations.  
     Still the use of politically affirmative language in the development plan can 
be explained in terms of historical needs of the country. That type of language 
certainly emanates from the understanding that, in the wake of independence, 
the people of South Sudan needed a political affirmation that their newly born 
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independent nation is going to be peaceful and developed and their age-old 
grievances are going to be heard and addressed.  
     When comes to peacebuilding, the SSDP’s chapter on Conflict Prevention 
& Security- Deepening Peace and Improving Security states the objective of 
peace building is to:  
 
defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Sudan, 
prevent the resurgence of conflict and uphold the constitution 
by providing equitable access to justice and maintaining law 
and order through institutions which are transparent, 
accountable and respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms (SSDP 2011, p. xix).  
 
The topmost emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity can be 
attributed to the newly independent state of the country, the bloodshed and 
the wounds of the war, but also the historically violent and even in post-
independent scenario apparently turbulent relations with the Sudan.  
     Though words such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
haven't been left apart, a highly prioritized mentions of words such as defense 
of sovereignty, territorial integrity, maintenance of law and order gives an 
instant impression that South Sudan's focus seems to be on promoting what 
Johan Galtung calls negative peace- an absence of overt violence and war or 
processes of violence reduction, but without due recourse to integration of 
human society or life enhancement mechanisms (Galtung 1964 p. 2, Galtung 
1996, p. 30).  
     The language used in the PRS and the CSDHPR differs to certain extent 
from the one used in the CPA and the SSDP. While the CPA and the SSDP try 
to be very promising and appear tremendously optimistic about the future, the 
PRS and the CSDHPR are rather cautious. Obviously, the timing of their 
appearance has something to do with these remarkable discrepancies in the 
tone of the language. The CPA and the SSDP appeared before and just after 
independence when the zeal and confidence and optimism was certainly high, 
whereas, the PRS and the CSDHPR were promulgated after two years of 
independence, with rather a bitter experience of fragile peace, growing 
internal conflicts, displacements and widespread corruption among ruling 
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elites. The adjacent figures presents a timeline view of the four policy 
documents and their timing of appearance.    
 
 
The PRS, for instance, is articulate about the limitations of the CPA and 
overtly expresses how it failed to end all practices of violence in South Sudan.  
 
The CPA brought peace and opportunities for human security 
and social development that Southern Sudan had not seen for 
decades. It did not put an end to historically entrenched 
practices such as cattle raiding which generate violence and 
insecurity, nor did it do away with the perception that 
corruption, nepotism and political privilege frustrate legitimate 
ambitions to participate more fully in the defining of a 
common future. (the PRS 2013, p. 10.) 
 
The CSDHPR, on the other hand, takes a different approach to produce an 
affirmative language. While people’s faith in political leadership was gradually 
waning, the document brings in God as an authority to have faith in.        
 
You know very well that had it not been for our consistent 
trust in God, we could have given up in the face of so many 
difficulties. But God helped us to the end...you remember that 
it is God who has helped this country to gain its freedom...it is 
distressing to see the very people who struggled shoulder to 
shoulder are now butchering each other as though they have 
so easily forgotten where God has taken us through. (The 
Figure 5.1: Timeline of South Sudanese peace policy documents  
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CSDHPR, p.3).   
 
This utmost emphasis on God is obviously an attempt to find an alternative 
faith figure for people but also influenced by the way the Healing Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission is constituted, which is explained later in the 
second section.    
 
5.2 Text as 'Discursive Practice': Exploring the 
Interdiscursivity in the Policy Documents  
Interdiscursivity is an analytical concept that links a discourse to other 
discourses. The term relates to the idea that discursive elements are imported 
to a discourse from other discourses. Interdiscursivity is closely linked to the 
idea of intertextuality which means the framing of a text’s meaning by 
another text, by using intertextual figures such as, allusion, translation, 
quotation, plagiarism, parody, pastiche and calque. (Gerard 1997, p.18; Hallo 
2010, p.608; Cancogni 1985 p.203-213.) Fairclough argues that intertextual 
analysis looks at text from the angle of discourse practice, that is basically 
looking at discourse practices reflected in the text. Unlike linguistic analysis, 
which is descriptive in nature, intertextual analysis tends to be interpretative. 
(Fairclough 1995, p. 16.)                                                                                          
     On the basis of the methodological framework of the CDA, the attempt 
here is to undertake an interdiscursive analysis of the policy documents so that 
one can go beyond the literal understanding of the text and be able to fathom 
the overtly unexpressed, but underlying discourses latent in the texts.  
     The selected policy papers contain a collection of massive text involving a 
number of issues dealing with South Sudan, and obviously various discourses 
can be identified throughout the texts. However, as the focus of this study, 
primarily, is on policy frameworks for sustainable peacebuilding, only the 
discourses that are deemed relevant to peacebuilding issues have been 
identified and discussed.  
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5.2.1 The Capitalist-Corporate Discourse:  
One of the discourses that is visible in the policy texts is what one can call a 
capitalist-corporate discourse. The policy texts articulate and uphold the 
capitalist-corporate discourse by giving an emphasis on private led growth, 
privatization, foreign investment and assistance.  
     The SSDP, for instance, highlights 'the importance of promoting private 
sector-led economic growth and the delivery of basic services in reducing the 
incidence of poverty among the population' (page xi).  
     The CPA talks about supporting a just world economic order (p.27), but 
doesn’t elaborate on that. As a development plan document, the SSDP is more 
articulate about the issue.    
     Emphasis on privatization and private-led growth signals that the country 
adopts, supports and promote a capitalist-corporate culture that, among 
others, allows people to amass private property, be part of a free and 
deregulated market economy, but also allows privatization of production 
means including delivery of basic services, health as well as education. 
     The capital-corporate discourse or South Sudan’s preference for market 
economy could be understood as a component of liberal peace agenda 
promoted in South Sudan. Market liberalization in war-torn post conflict 
scenarios has faced criticisms as it tends to increase the vulnerability of 
populations to poverty and shadow economic activity (Pugh 2005).    
 
5.2.2 The Curative Peace Discourse:  
The second discourse that is visible in the policy documents can be named the 
curative peace discourse. The policy documents prioritize peace and security 
as top priorities and repeatedly mention measures to be adopted to ensure 
peace and security in the country. Such measures, however, are primarily 
curative ones, and not so much of preventive and holistic. For instance, the 
SSDP explains:  
 
Peace-building involves a range of measures aimed at reducing 
the risk of relapse into conflict, by strengthening national 
capacities at all levels of conflict management and laying the 
foundation for sustainable peace and development... 
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Peacebuilding as a process is the responsibility of South Sudan 
but external involvement can be critical and very supportive 
(The SSDP, p. 9).  
 
The CPA, on the other hand, talks of the need to reach a ‘just and sustainable 
peace’, but doesn’t provide concrete measures as such. Instead, the document 
concentrates on strengthening peace by administrative and security measures. 
The CPA disqualifies all other armed groups in Sudan and requires them to 
side either the SPLA or the SAF.  
 
No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to 
operate outside the two forces...The parties agree to address 
the status of other armed groups in the country with the view 
of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country 
and to realize full inclusiveness in the transitional process. (The 
CPA, p 89-90.) 
 
When events unfolded, this provision proved to be potentially dangerous, as 
only a few rebel groups decided to join the ‘mainstream’ and a number of 
them didn’t recognize the peace process at all. Historical grievances of many 
groups seem to have remained unaddressed and a number of new rebel groups 
sprang throughout South Sudan in the wake of independence.  
     The CPA’s chapter on the DDRR (Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-
Integration and Reconciliation) recognizes the DDRR process mostly as a 
civilian affair with a vital military input (p. 118) but doesn’t offer a 
framework that would engage civilian prowess either in DDRR or in 
peacebuilding in general. In fact, the CPA doesn’t offer any framework of 
sustainable peace, though it repeatedly makes statements about quick, just and 
sustainable peace.    
     The peacebuilding measures envisioned in the policy documents are mainly 
curative ones, emphasizing the idea that peace can be achieved by curative 
measures such as post-conflict management or tight security measures with 
heavy investments in national defense mechanisms. For instance, the SSDP 
emphasizes on strengthening of national capacities at all levels of conflict 
management, which basically means improving capacity of agencies that 
maintain law and order, which is not necessarily undesirable, but this 
  
83 
prioritization neglects another part of conflict transformation which Johan 
Galtung calls the preventive measures, by which peace is an 
'absence/reduction of violence of all kinds', but also as 'nonviolent and 
creative conflict transformation' and, thereby, peace work is 'work to reduce 
violence by peaceful means' (Galtung 1996, p. 9).  
 
5.2.3 The Good Governance Discourse 
Another discourse that has been articulated through the policy documents is 
that of good governance. Repeated mentions of terms such as good 
governance, human rights, rule of law, democracy and transparency are pretty 
common throughout the policy documents.  
 
Pursuit of good governance, accountability, transparency, 
democracy, and the rule of law at all levels of government to 
achieve lasting peace (The CPA, p. 12).   
 
[The parties are] convinced that decentralization and 
empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal 
principles of effective and fair administration of the country. 
(The CPA, p.11) 
 
The SSDP contains dozens of mentions of good governance and links good 
governance with an effective service delivery, consolidation of peace and 
democracy and rule of law.  The PRS paper, similarly, includes the good-
governance rhetoric in its core mission statement as follows:  
 
The South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission will 
work to promote and maintain a sustainable peace in South 
Sudan. It will work against all forms of violence through 
building unity, pursuing reconciliation and transforming 
conflict through dialogue, policy-making, advocacy, 
networking, and the promotion of good governance, 
participatory democracy and human development. (The PRS, 
p. 15.)  
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This good-governance discourse can be linked again to the liberal peace 
discourse, i.e. the idea that democracies are more peaceful and rule of law is 
desirable for maintaining sustainable peacebuilding. The inclusion of good 
governance discourse in the South Sudanese peace policy documents can also 
be linked to substantial Western influence during the peace negotiations, but 
also after the independence of South Sudan. For instance, various, particularly 
Western, donor agencies supported the formulation of all the policy 
documents, but more vigorously of the SSDP and the PRS.       
 
5.2.4 The Development Aid-Dependency Discourse:  
All four policy documents studied emphatically call for foreign assistance in 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction of South Sudan. One of few 
commonalities of the four policy documents is that they are very welcoming 
of international assistance and have shown substantial faith in international 
donor agencies.    
Peacebuilding as a process is the responsibility of South Sudan 
but external involvement can be critical and very supportive 
(The SSDP, p. 9).  
 
The CPA, too, calls for international assistance at different stages and the 
requested assistance is not only monetary, but also military; such as calling 
for a UN Peacekeeping Mission; technical, such as ceasefire and election 
observation and so forth.  
 
In agreeing to these wealth sharing agreements the Parties 
signal to the international community that it will have to play 
a strong and constructive role in providing post-conflict 
construction/reconstruction assistance to Sudan, especially to 
Southern Sudan and other war affected and least developed 
areas (The CPA, p. 48).  
 
The CPA gives an unrestricted access to international observers to monitor 
ceasefire related activities (p. 106) and anticipates foreign assistance for post-
conflict reconstruction, however, it also expects foreign assistance to complete 
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basic operations of the peace agreement such as formation of Joint Military 
Teams (JMTs) and for funding of the armed forces.  
 
[Funding of the Armed Forces]…the Government of Southern 
Sudan shall raise financial resources from both local and 
foreign sources and seek international assistance (the CPA, p. 
116).  
 
Similarly, the PRS and the CSDHPR too equally look for foreign assistance 
and cooperation in peacebuilding in South Sudan. The PRS, for instance, 
states that ‘the enhancement and prospects for peace is a common task of the 
national and international communities’ (p.17) and argues that the Peace 
Commission seeks to promote and conduct peace activities ‘with the support 
of multilateral and bilateral public partners and international and national 
NGOs’ (p.12). The CSDHPR sees growing public demand and continued 
international support as important factors that make consolidation of peace 
and reconciliation plausible in South Sudan (p.10).          
     This desire for external support or call for an international involvement 
can be seen in terms of the development aid/dependency discourse, the 
stereotyped idea that development aid or international engagement is 
benevolent and helps promote development and peace. The call for 
international support in the policy documents is basically a call for increased 
foreign aid and external assistance for advancement of the ongoing peace 
process and post-conflict reconstruction. Given that the country is very rich 
in natural resources and hasn't been able to build efficient and robust 
institutions to sufficiently protect its self-interests, any form of foreign 
involvement, whether in form of development aid, conflict mediation, 
consultation or military assistance, must be perceived cautiously. On the other 
hand, seeking international support for a myriad of issues appears to lessen 
South Sudan’s confidence to stand and perform as an independent nation.   
 
5.2.5 The Religious Discourse: 
While the other three documents remain more or less indifferent towards 
religious affairs, though the CPA argues that ‘religious, customs and beliefs are 
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a source of moral strength and inspiration for the Sudanese people’ (p.5), one 
of the policy documents, the CSDHPR, promulgated by the Committee for 
National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, heavily relies on a religious 
rhetoric. The document claims that the people of South Sudan are deeply 
religious and reconciliation equates ultimately to finding peace with God 
(p.9).    
 
The people of South Sudan are deeply religious, whether 
followers of Christianity, Islam or traditional religions...it is 
our faith in God, which brings us together and gives us the 
strength and courage to heal ourselves...if there is no spiritual 
foundation, our attempts at reconciliation will be flawed and it 
will not succeed.  (The CSDHPR p. 4) 
 
The document also calls for a faith based social justice (p.8) and makes a very 
shallow statement about socio-political conflicts claiming that ‘communities 
and nations are made-up of weak, fallible, broken human beings, who have 
an inherent tendency towards conflict’ (p.7).   
     The God rhetoric and an incessant focus on divine guidance and faith can 
be explained in terms of four different aspects here. First, the chairman of the 
Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation is the South 
Sudanese Archbishop and probably it’s his religious affinity that influenced 
the text of the document. Second, since the faith in political leadership was 
decreasing for different reasons, the attempt to fill that faith vacuum with God 
seemed to have been a secure alternative. Third, the desire to come up with a 
divine substitute or an all inclusive faith figure might have been triggered by 
the fact that the Sudan in the North practised Sharia as its principal document 
for governance and regarded Allah as its primary guider. Fourth, the God 
rhetoric comes handy when one has to advocate issues of forgiveness, 
reconciliation, pardon, generosity and repentance and deliberately avoid issues 
of justice, reparation, compensation and judicial investigations of crimes 
committed during the war. This emphasis on God clearly seems to be 
influenced by South Sudan’s intention to forget the atrocities, get along with 
impunity and move forward.      
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5.2.6 The Reconciliation Discourse:  
The policy documents repeatedly stress on reconciliation and assert on the 
need to forget the past and move forward. The reconciliation discourse starts 
right from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The CPA underlines 
‘tolerance’ as the basis of coexistence (p.23) and calls for the promotion of 
‘peace culture and confidence building measures’ without specifying how 
(p.95). The CPA avoids the issue of transitional justice by mentioning that 
‘national healing and reconciliation process shall be discussed on and dealt 
with within the discussion on the implementation modalities’ (p. 121).  
     The CSDHPR urges South Sudanese to accept faith based reconciliation 
(p.12) and argues that ‘reconciliation can better thrive in such a context, 
where there is the eagerness to put the past to rest and embrace the future’ 
(p.10).   
 
Forgiveness is painful but it is the bitter pill we need. We have 
to swallow our pride for the sake of the survival of our young 
nation (The CSDHPR, p.5).  
 
Without reconciliation, there will be no South Sudan, or at 
least, it will degenerate into a failed state, with decades of 
conflict and misery ahead of us (The CSDHPR, p.4).  
 
     These statements of the Committee for National Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation as pronounced in the CSDHPR clearly try to impart first a 
sense of persuasion and then fear. The first statement tries to persuade South 
Sudanese to forgive and forget the bitter past for the sake of the nation, while 
the second one, more emphatically, asserts that failing to reconcile means once 
again decades of conflict and misery ahead. This is a clear indication of 
cashing in on people’s aspirations to progress forward and an attempt to 
impose a forced reconciliation. 
     The CSDHPR does talk about a few measures of transitional justice, such 
as possibilities of providing reparation, acknowledgment of responsibilities 
and public apology, but doesn’t offer any definite framework for that. The 
document heavily focuses on forgiveness and doesn’t show any interest in 
investigations of serious war crimes committed during the independence 
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movement, but also during conflicts that erupted after independence.  
     Interestingly, it was discovered during this research that the CSDHPR 
thoroughly copies a substantial portion of text from a similar document 
(Towards a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic 
Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation) that was 
introduced a year earlier in Liberia. The massive plagiarism does give 
significant space to question the intention behind South Sudan’s national 
healing and reconciliation program and one can argue that the program seems 
to be aimed at ‘showing’ rather than ‘doing’.  
     The PRS document, on the other hand, states that its aim is to promoting 
‘an inclusive national reconciliation process’ (p.4) and enlists the following 
components as guiding principles for peace and national reconciliation.     
- Respect for all persons 
- Unity of South Sudan and a common identity  
- Peaceful coexistence  
- Reconciliation, forgiveness and opposition to hate speech  
- Tolerance (The PRS, p.6-7) 
 
Thus, the PRS too emphasizes on concepts of tolerance, reconciliation, respect, 
forgiveness, coexistence and refrains from raising broader issues of social 
justice, sustainable peacebuilding and formulation of transitional justice 
mechanisms.   
     In a very similar fashion, the SSDP links peacebuilding with security issues 
and its chapter on Conflict Prevention and Security – Deepening Peace and 
Improving Security states:  
 
Efforts to increase security and deepen peace-building will 
focus on solidifying a lasting peace with neighbours and 
overcoming persistent and deep-rooted internal sources of 
conflict through comprehensive national and local peace 
dialogue and reconciliation programmes. Specifically, there 
will be a comprehensive national programme to transform the 
uniformed security services; one which addresses 
demobilisation needs holistically, including Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and provides 
security and dignity to all ex-combatants. The target is to have 
completed DDR for almost 78,000 ex-combatants by the end 
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of this plan period. A new civilian-led National Security 
Architecture (NSA) will (a) transfer local security from 
military to a civilian police force, and (b) transform SPLA into 
a smaller, modern and more efficient force. (The SSDP, p. xix)  
 
The statements in the given paragraph reinforce the reconciliation as well as 
negative/curative peace discourses. Calling for provisions of sheer 
bureaucratic and political nature such as a comprehensive national program 
to transfer the uniformed services, and the DDR process and the construction 
of a new National Security Architecture and so forth, the SSDP prioritizes the 
importance of security measures, bureaucratic institutions, and some sort of 
central planning and technical/bureaucratic solutions to solve the country’s 
some of the codifficult problems.  
 
5.3 Discourse in Context: Historical Demand, 
Post-independent Zeal and Continuation of 
Impunity   
In order to fully grasp the aims, intention, the language used, the priorities 
set-up and the overall rationale of the policy documents, one needs to sketch 
out broader social, political, historical relations and structures from which 
these documents emerged and got promulgated.  
     First, the emphasis on change, progress, prosperity and development 
obviously emanates from the commitment of the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement that started in the early 1980s with the aim of liberating Southern 
Sudan from the oppressive regime in Sudan. As a SPLM political document 
puts it, the armed conflict was a 'natural reaction of the oppressed and 
marginalized peoples of the Sudan against the various Khartoum-based 
governments' (SPLM 2012, p.1). And obviously secession and liberation 
weren't the only goals, with them were the promises for better future for 
Southern Sudanese people, the right to self determination, poverty eradication 
and so on and so forth. And these policy documents had to reflect and dwell 
upon those promises.  
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     The discourses identified in the policy documents seem to have contextual 
links to the ground realities in South Sudan. For instance, the capitalist-
corporate discourse and the development aid/dependency discourses 
pronounced in the documents could be identified in terms of the involvement 
of foreign powers that are said to be assisting the country in many ways. For 
instance, as of March 2012, the World Bank led Multi-donor Trust Fund for 
South Sudan has disbursed more than $505 million in aid (The World Bank, 
2013). And it is well known that The World Bank, historically, has been the 
darling of corporate capitalism, privatization, the notorious structural 
adjustment programs and so forth. South Sudan is a member of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) too, and according to an IMF brief, it 
intends to provide South Sudan US$10.3 million during 2013-2015  (IMF, 
2012), obviously with a number of conditions and strings attached to it.   
     In addition, there seems to be a clear nexus between the curative peace and 
the reconciliation discourses sustained in the policy documents. While the 
curative peace discourse emphasises on peace by order and security instead of 
welfare and peaceful means, the reconciliation discourse adds on to that by 
advocating for almost an  unconditional reconciliation call.  
     Since its birth as a nation, South Sudan has been exclusively governed by 
the SPLM/A and since their leadership was responsible for many of the war 
crimes committed during the war years, their desire to investigate severe war 
crimes and human rights violations is minimal. This lack of political will in 
addressing severe war crimes is certainly going to be a huge sustenance for 
impunity and is likely to create a fertile ground for other bloody conflicts in 
the country. Lack of transitional justice mechanisms has been often found to 
be discussed in South Sudanese media. For instance, the following excerpt 
from an oped column published in a South Sudanese online news portal 
emphatically raises that issue:   
 
The most tragic about the two civil wars we had undergone is 
the loss felt by the people; hundreds of thousands of us today 
suffer from various levels of trauma as a result of either having 
being born and brought up during war times whilst others 
fought at any given time during any of the two wars. We carry 
deep scars of bullets either physically on our bodies or 
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mentally by having witnessed the innocent deaths of millions 
over the years. The trauma is surmountable and heavy... the 
mental impact is leading many to suffer from mental ailments 
and sicknesses including madness, chronic depression in 
different forms and high temperaments to mention a few... The 
aggrieved People must feel protected, listened to and justice 
done to them. The aggressors and perpetrators must be 
investigated through public hearings and justice must take its 
course accordingly. (Jambo 2011.) 
  
     While the religious discourse or the God rhetoric seems to have emanated 
from the desire to have a different religious identity than that of the North, 
persuade people to forget the past, have faith in God, forgive and move 
forward; the good governance discourse, on the other hand, tries to assure 
South Sudanese that the existing political-bureaucratic set-up in South Sudan 
is committed and good enough to deliver the promises made during the 
decades-long independence movement. This is obviously South-Sudanese 
ruling class’s predilection to, by and large, retain the old political and 
bureaucratic system inherited from the Sudan and be indifferent and reluctant 
to implement drastic changes as per ordinary people’s aspirations.  
     In addition, one important observation one can make from the policy 
documents is that they do not talk much about participation of grassroots 
populations in priority setting, decision-making, peacebuilding initiatives and 
so forth. While reading, the documents give an overall impression that the 
texts basically intend to promote top-to-bottom approach to development 
and peacebuilding in general. People's direct participation, not only of local 
officials and bureaucrats, should have been ensured to make peacebuilding 
and development initiatives more holistic, participative and widely 
implementable.  
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Chapter VI 
 
Conclusions   
 
The aim of this chapter is to reflect upon the major findings of this study and 
offer some conclusive remarks. The second section of this chpter makes a few 
recommendations for future research. 
     The main aim of this study was to understand the peace policy framework 
of South Sudan that the country has adopted in its post-independence peace 
and development policies. A special emphasis was put on identifying types of 
discourses, beliefs and ideologies that were adopted, maintained or rejected in 
the policy documents.  
     Having been based on Fairclough's three-dimensional model for Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA); (1) linguistic features and texts, (2) 
interdiscursivity, and (3) explanation of wider social, political, historical and 
cultural context; the study carries out a critical discourse analysis of four 
South Sudanese peace policy documents. The selected Policy documents 
namely were The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoS and 
SPLM/A 2005 (the CPA), South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 (the 
SSDP), South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013-2015 (the PRS), 
Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 
2013 (the CSDHPR).   
     The analysis discusses that the Policy documents were in fact introduced as 
a metaphor of 'hope', 'progress' and 'enthusiasm' keeping in mind the post-
independence scenario of South Sudan. The policy documents that were 
introduced right after independence are more hopeful to the future than the 
ones that were introduced after 2 years.     
     In the interdiscursivity analysis, a number of discourses have been 
identified and discussed. First, the policy documents maintain a capitalist-
corporate discourse that welcomes and favor a capitalist-corporate culture in 
everyday affairs and promotes neoliberal concepts of privatization, foreign 
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investment and establishment of a market economy. Identifying capitalist-
corporate discourse is important for peacebuilding too because the economic 
set-up and market relations play a major role in determining quality of life 
and people’s access to welfare, which ultimately have an impact on  
sustainable peacebuilding. 
     The second discourse identified was that of curative-peace which 
prioritizes on security measures and institutional strengthening instead of 
welfare and quality of life when it comes to the question of peacebuilding. So 
the policy measures constituted in the policy documents seem to be crafted to 
promote, what Johan Galtung calls, negative peace rather than positive peace 
(Galtung 1964). Preferring a negative peace would mean trying to achieve 
mere absence of violence and war, but with no guarantees of life enhancement 
mechanisms for ordinary citizens.   
     The third and fourth discourse were the good governance discourse and 
the development aid/dependency discourse. As their names characterize, the 
good-governance discourse tries to maintain the old political-bureaucratic 
model inherited from the North (Sudan) by trying to persuade people that it is 
capable of and committed to promote good governance, human rights and 
rule of law. Whereas, the policy documents maintain the development 
aid/dependency discourse by looking for foreign financial aid/loan and 
technical/moral support for a number of issues. Foreign assistance, without an 
word of caution, has been prioritized and taken as a key element in all four 
policy documents. 
     The fifth and the sixth discourses pronounced in the policy documents, the 
religious and the reconciliation discourses, try to convince South Sudanese to 
forget and forgive the past atrocities and move forward. The religious 
discourse as pronounced primarily in the Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions 
for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (the CSDHPR) calls for people to have 
faith in God and forget everything about the past for the sake of the newly 
born nation. The reconciliation discourse, similarly, advocates for an 
unconditional reconciliation, tolerance, forgiveness and points out to the 
danger of another civil war in case of failing to do so.  
     The Policy documents are silent about transitional justice mechanism and 
apart from the DDR, do not talk anything about investigation of serious war 
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crimes committed during the decades long war but also during conflicts that 
spread after independence. A transitional justice mechanism would have 
provided justice to the victims of nearly a half-century long civil war and 
would have fastened the healing process of war-generated sufferings. On the 
other hand, it would have worked as a deterrent to impunity and recurrence 
of violent insurgencies in and around the region. Previous research warns that 
South Sudan’s reluctance to deal with transitional justice issues is likely to 
prove costly over the long run (see for instance Nwanegbo & Odigbo 2013) 
and this research reiterates the likelihood and the danger of further violence.  
     Based on the measures constituted in the policy papers, it is argued here 
that the crux of the South Sudanese peace policy framework is promotion of 
negative peace; mainly through security measures and top-down approaches, 
with minimal attention to national reconciliation and an abandoned appetite 
for transitional justice processes.  
     The study also finds that South Sudanese peace and development policies 
seem to be greatly influenced by so called Western ideas of liberal peace that 
aim to promote liberal economy, democracy, marketization and espouse the 
tenets of globalization. Emphasis on good governance, rule of law, human 
rights promotion is widespread in the texts, however, since there was no clear 
roadmap for implementation, they can not be regarded more than a political 
rhetoric.    
     The policy documents exhibit also a lack of coherence. While one 
document, for instance, focuses on security measures, another calls for having 
faith in God and a sense of forgiveness for peacebuilding. The linkage between 
broader development agendas and peace policies is poorly established and 
weakly manifested in the policy documents. One example is that the policy 
documents prioritize peace by security over peace by welfare, development or 
other peaceful means.   
     The topmost optimism expressed in the policy documents do not seem to 
represent the ground realities in South Sudan, given that while formulating 
these documents, South Sudan had a very fragile and tensed relations with the 
Sudan and a number of arms insugencies were active or sprouting within the 
newly independent country. These peace policy documents fail to anticipate 
the likelihood of tussel with the Sudan, and also fail to take into account any 
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possible unrest and ethnic violence within South Sudan. These findings 
strengthen the critical remarks made by previous researchers (such as Ylönen 
2012, Nwanegbo & Odigbo 2013) that the peace negotiation and subsequent 
arrangements couldn’t be really comprehensive and coherent in nature, 
thereby posing a threat of future belligerencies and bloodshed.         
 
6.1 Recommendation for future research:  
During the course of this research, the researcher encountered a few 
interesting issues that could be considered by future researchers for further 
study. First, since IGAD’s involvement in Sudan-Southern Sudan peace talks 
was extremely important one and since IGAD constitutes a group of 8 
developing countries in Eastern Africa, south-south cooperation in peace 
negotiations and peacebuilding is certainly an interesting and important topic 
to study. Second, since this study limited itself only to a narrow selection of 4 
policy documents, future researchers can focus on a comprehensive set of 
policy documents and pay attention to their implementation practices and 
outcome modalities. Third, since independence, the lines of ethnic division 
have widened and the internal conflict has escalated in South Sudan. Future 
researchers could focus their work on similar issues such as, greed-grivances 
and identity politics, escalation of the internal conflict, divisions along the 
ethnic lines, state sponsored violence, and the impact of external agents, such 
as the UNMISS, in peacebuiding.  
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